What's your favorite debate case?

[AClare]

I know we all have "pet cases" we've had over the years, and I have had a bit of a drought of "fun" cases...I was wondering if people would like to share what cases they've really loved running to help me prepare for next fall!

Clare

[USC MissingLink]

Post-Modern Cartography - Replace the Mercator World Map with the Peters' Projection Map.

That was my personal favorite.
jEd

[Western Amy]

Voting reform: replace the current voting system with a 24 hour voting day that starts and stops at the same time regardless of time zone.

[MSCD Roadrunner]

Adè will probably kill me for putting this in the open, but we've run it before, and it did inspire our mascot, so I should be okay.

Monkey Case:

People import monkeys (simians, not musicians) as pets. Said monkeys turn out to be viscious, diseased beasts and are released into cities. Thus, a two pronged threat, the monkeys themselves and rats which contract hepatits and spread it to humans. The case: ban monkeys as pets. it get's really interesting if opp. counterplans.

[truthisjust]

my favorite case was when we would define the house as a rational person and argue that rational people should not believe in god.

[USC MissingLink]

^figures. god-damned athiests (pun intended) ;)

[AClare]

A rational person does not draw conclusions without proof. A rational person would not believe in the non-existance of God.

I would love to see that case, I'd run a counter-advocacy of agnosticism

[truthisjust]

what do you consider proof? The case was based on the rationalization of god. The idea that god is contridictory. Sometimes we would run that you should not be a christian... that was always fun.

[AClare]

How could God be contradictory--are you using the Bible? I can definitely agree that the JudeoChristian God is contradictory--but the idea of God in general? Some intelligence that created the world? I don't see what you would use as evidence for OR against.

[truthisjust]

Well in order for there to even be a debate a definition of god has to be used. The one we used was an all knowing, all powerful, and all loving god. While this is a judeochristian version, it is not ONLY a judeochristian version.

[AClare]

Who else views God that way? I can't think of any of the major world religions that believe that and the minor ones that do are all offshoots of JudeoChristianity. Sounds pretty ethnocentric.

[scooter]

Slight input: The concept of God among Jews and Christians is __a different concept__ between the two religions (as it is with the third member of the Triumbrant, it's close cousin of Islam). Beyond the fact that the Trinity devolves itself entirely from the core concepts of much of Judaism, the additional realization concerning the concept of God in the Jewish/Hebrew Bible is __not the same concept of God__ within the Christian Bible is forthright. For example, the simple fact that we as Jews have names for the different manifestations of God- of which the Kabbalists believe there are over 350--, several of which would be as foreign to Christian thinking as the notions of the Divine of Islam is to Christianity-- despite the inherent fact that of course the Holy Qu'ran stemmed from the earlier writings of Judaism and Christianity. See __A History of God__ for a fine analysis of how the two and three religions do indeed differ despite their historical roots (yes, Abram/Abraham started each--doesn't mean they are all the same)

In short, did Christianity stem from Judaism? Sure, even Jews who negate the existence of Christ (yes, in case you're wondering, I'm one of them) would most likely admit to such . But to think that the two religions created and believed in the same concept of God is erroneous. Simply, there were many changes between the two (and then three) texts in the concept of the role of divine, the character of the Divine, the manifestation (on this plane and others) of the Divine, and of course the onus of the afterlife (which has become all but dead in Judaism, and is a thriving aspect of Christianity)-- aspects which are again based upon similar historical examples as Islam but again result in different concepts of God.

As far as a loving God/dess, I think that examples exist/ed in much of the ancient religions (the role of Hera for woman served some such purpose-- and many gods who intercepted on the behalf of their love of humans. Further, the role of the Earth Mother among many modern day Wiccans, the protector known as the God of the Hunt among ancient druid rights, and the protectionist spirit of several indigenous religions, even in the (now) United States, illustrated in cultural examples such as the coming of age among Aztec women who are inherently connected to the warmth and power of the sun-- as well as a number of Hindu gods, the least of which is Ganesh who has served as a connection with his god parents on the behalf of humans. Additionally, the role of the Bodishatva who again are likened to the Divine within some sects of Buddhism who show humans the way through this earthly plane also illustrates the concept of a loving and caring god structure.

In short, the Divine has taken many paths and faces. Are there similarities? Of course. But we can not nullify their differences either.

S

[scooter]

Slight input: The concept of God among Jews and Christians is __a different concept__ between the two religions (as it is with the third member of the Triumbrant, it's close cousin of Islam). Beyond the fact that the Trinity devolves itself entirely from the core concepts of much of Judaism, the additional realization concerning the concept of God in the Jewish/Hebrew Bible is __not the same concept of God__ within the Christian Bible is forthright. For example, the simple fact that we as Jews have names for the different manifestations of God- of which the Kabbalists believe there are over 350--, several of which would be as foreign to Christian thinking as the notions of the Divine of Islam is to Christianity-- despite the inherent fact that of course the Holy Qu'ran stemmed from the earlier writings of Judaism and Christianity. See __A History of God__ for a fine analysis of how the two and three religions do indeed differ despite their historical roots (yes, Abram/Abraham started each--doesn't mean they are all the same)

In short, did Christianity stem from Judaism? Sure, even Jews who negate the existence of Christ (yes, in case you're wondering, I'm one of them) would most likely admit to such . But to think that the two religions created and believed in the same concept of God is erroneous. Simply, there were many changes between the two (and then three) texts in the concept of the role of divine, the character of the Divine, the manifestation (on this plane and others) of the Divine, and of course the onus of the afterlife (which has become all but dead in Judaism, and is a thriving aspect of Christianity)-- aspects which are again based upon similar historical examples as Islam but again result in different concepts of God.

As far as a loving God/dess, I think that examples exist/ed in much of the ancient religions (the role of Hera for woman served some such purpose-- and many gods who intercepted on the behalf of their love of humans. Further, the role of the Earth Mother among many modern day Wiccans, the protector known as the God of the Hunt among ancient druid rights, and the protectionist spirit of several indigenous religions, even in the (now) United States, illustrated in cultural examples such as the coming of age among Aztec women who are inherently connected to the warmth and power of the sun-- as well as a number of Hindu gods, the least of which is Ganesh who has served as a connection with his god parents on the behalf of humans. Additionally, the role of the Bodishatva who again are likened to the Divine within some sects of Buddhism who show humans the way through this earthly plane also illustrates the concept of a loving and caring god structure.

In short, the Divine has taken many paths and faces. Are there similarities? Of course. But we can not nullify their differences either.

S

[MSCD Roadrunner]

The problem I have with the definition of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-loving lies primarily in the presumption of motive. Focusing on the God potrayed in both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian holy books reveals several examples of an angry, vengeful God. A diety who destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, a God who cast his children out of paradise after what I view as the biggest set-up in all of history. We're also presented with a God who allows a significant amount of evils to be perpetrated in this world. A common rationalization of this argument is that such vengence and evil is supposed to make us stronger, improve our souls or "build character." I think this is where the entire presumption ofr motive comes in. To define God as all-loving assumes that there is a universal motive behind all of existence. Everything happens because God loves us. I view this as mortals, and lord knows what fools we be, telling God how to act.

Furthermore, I think arguing that God is contradictory under the given definition is a tautology. To argue that God is all-powerful and all-loving creates a contradiction. Moving beyond the clichè argument about the big rock, I think the existence of evil in the world makes this def. inherently contradictory. If a diety is all-powerful, then it should be able to create a perfect world without any suffering. If a diety is all-loving, then it should want to create a world without suffering.

Fiat Veritas,
David Gallivan

PS
If you happen to be in the mood, could you please backchannel me Scooter? I've got some questions you may be able to answer. Thank you

D

"Someday, after we have mastered the winds, the waves, the tides and gravity, we shall harness for God the energies of love. Then, for the second time in the history of the world, man will have discovered fire."

-Chardin

[Dan6814]

Disclaimer: I do not believe in the Bible as a literal chronicle of events, nor do I believe in organized religion in general. All the following arguments work on the general assumption that the Bible is a reasonably accurate account of literal events. Obviously, the Bible as metaphor would be a significantly different argument.

I don't think the existence of evil in the world is a disproof of God's existence. First, as noted earlier in this thread, God does not necessarily have to be theistic: even within the Judeo-Christian tradition, there are strong schools of pantheists (like Paul Tillich), panentheists (like Mordecai Kaplan), and process theologians (like John Cobb). Someone like Tillich, who (I'm simplifying) argues that God is the manifestation of reason, would not be put off by the existence of evil, as physical suffering is irrelevant to obedience to reason.

But specifically within a theistic conception of God, suffering on this world doesn't necessarily mean that God isn't omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent (or "Triple-O". Let's start with the big rock example (just for clarity: "Can God create a boulder so heavy that it cannot be lifted, even by God?"). First, it doesn't constitute a disproof of God is because it entails a logical contradiction in its application, and God is superior if it only acts in accordance with reason and logic. A God that could act against logic, if we consider logical and reasoned action as a good, could be considered a flawed and inferior Being. Second, we fail to specifically identify an action that God cannot do. Could God create a square triangle? What does that statement even mean, if the terms "square" and "triangle" are mutually exclusive? There is no way to conceive of such a thing; how we can say to God, "You can't create this," if what we mean by "this" is inconceivable?

The existence of suffering, furthermore, can be a necessary condition for the best world. David, you pooh-pooh the existence of suffering as a testing machanism, because it "assumes that there is a universal motive behind all of existence," and this tells God how to act. I don't think this is prescriptive for God; rather, it's an interpretation of past action. The explanation of suffering as a test isn't supposed to consitute a proof of God as omnipotent, etc.; rather, it's an argument against a disproof of God. Could we be wrong? Sure, but the "suffering as a test" argument just says that certain events that occur are conceivably consistent with a Triple-O God's existence.

Suffering can also exist because it is included within the best possible scenario. Remember the logical contradiction analysis earlier; God can't create a world that is logically contradictory. Therefore, there's a limit to what can be created. If the exitence of life on land and on sea requires that the environment be relatively flexible, then we have to live with earthquakes, tidal waves, and volcanoes. Also, the Eath might not be the only creation of God where life capable of understanding and experiencing suffering exists. We may think that there's an amazing amount of suffering proportionate to the number of existing beings here, but if there are a trillion other planets that we'd describe as paradise whose continued joy relies on a certain level of suffering on Earth.

Finally, and I'm sure everyone's heard this before, God may allow suffering to be perpetrated by beings on each other to allow for the freedom of choice. If there is a world beyond this one, in which judgement is made on our actions, there need to be actions which can be judged, meaning that there have to be instances in which we can choose to do either the right thing or the wrong thing. If we can only decide to do the right and moral thing, then there isn't a choice at all; we are controlled as drones to do God's bidding. The occasional (ok, frequent) unfortunate consequence of this free choice is human suffering; in order to judge us as moral beings, however, this choice has to be legitimate.

Dan

[MSCD Roadrunner]

My original post included two seperate arguments, let me clarify what they are.

"The existence of suffering, furthermore, can be a necessary condition for the best world. David, you pooh-pooh the existence of suffering as a testing machanism, because it "assumes that there is a universal motive behind all of existence," and this tells God how to act. I don't think this is prescriptive for God; rather, it's an interpretation of past action. The explanation of suffering as a test isn't supposed to consitute a proof of God as omnipotent, etc.; rather, it's an argument against a disproof of God."

This is in response to my first argument, that the "triple-O" def. of God proscribes motive. In essence, I'm contending that when you define God as all-loving, you have mortals proscribing motives on the immortal. In essence, Man saying God must act as _____ because I say so. This strikes me as wrong, with the created assuming power over the creator.

My second argument was that the triple-O def. of God is inherently contradictory. I want to clarify here that I'm not making any claims about the existence of God. All I'm saying is that the definition given seems to be inherently abusive for a debate case arguing that God is contradictory. Simply put, and all-loving God would want to end suffering while an all-powerful God would be able to. Thus, as suffering exists, this definition is flawed.

"God can't create a world that is logically contradictory. Therefore, there's a limit to what can be created."

An object cannot be described as all-powerful if you apply the word "can't" to it. With apoligizes to Miracle Max, if God can't do something, he's only mostly powerful. The logical contradiction argument also fails here. You argue that God can't act against logic. My response is two pronged. First, if you assume that "logic" is inherent in the fabric of the universe, then my response is that, to the X-tians at least, God created the universe. If logic is an inherent part of God's creation, then God is responsible for it's constraints and should be able transcend logic. You give no reason for an all-powerful supreme being to be constrained by logic, when logic must be God's creation. The second prong of this argument is that logic isn't inherent in the universe. Logic is the creation of mortal minds. If we can't concieve of something, we say it's illogical. You argue that God can't contradict logic, my response is that logic is a mortal constraint. I don't view the big rock paradox as a disproof of God's existence, I view it as proof of the limited ability of mortal minds.

I'm not arguing here for or against the existence of God. I'm arguing that the definition of a single supreme being as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-loving is inherently contradictory.

[joecool12321]

Yay! A "holy war" that isn't about vi v. emacs (lame computer joke, sorry).

"I'm not arguing here for or against the existence of God. I'm arguing that the definition of a single supreme being as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-loving is inherently contradictory."

Would you say the definition of a single supreme being as all-powerful and all knowing is inherently contradictory? It seems that you would, although I disagree with you.

"An object cannot be described as all-powerful if you apply the word "can't" to it."

I love the idea of, "He's only mostly God, and mostly God is slightly limited." Thanks for the laugh.

But I have two responses :D First, all I have to do is say, "OK, God can a rock so big he can't move it, he just won't do it." Thus, since the rock is never actualized, God is never truly limited, only possibly limited. And possible limitations aren't real limitations. But I don't find that answer deeply satisfactory, and I doubt you will, too! My second response, then, is that the very question is non-sensical. I think this is an example of an apparently simple question which requires a deep answer. They are not that unique - the question of gravity still isn't answered! So let's take a jaunt down explanation lane!

The question, "Can God make a rock so big he can't lift it" is what some people call a pseudo-question. While it apparently has much force, close examination reveals it to be a weak objection. It's like asking, "Can God win an arm-wrestling contest against himself?" or "Can God be stronger than God?"

The question is a pseudo-question because it treats God as two, rather than one. The phrase "stronger than" is only a comparison - it takes two beings to make the comparison. For example, I could say (hypothetically) "Gavin is stronger than John." However, I can't say, "Skip is stronger than Skip." Since God is only one, it makes no sense (it commits a logical fallacy) to ask if God is stronger than himself. The question proves nothing about God, because the question itself is incoherent.

The only way it can be "rescued" from this incoherency is to pit one aspect of God's ability against another aspect of that ability. The "rock" question pits God's creative power greater against his motive power. This notion, however, is a straw man, when viewed from a Christian perspective.

The Biblical concept of omnipotence doesn't mean God can do anything. It has to do with power, not ability per se. He can't create a square circle; he can't create a person with free will that couldn't choose evil. None of these, though, have to do with power. They all deal with creative ability, which Christianity never claims God has.

Whew. I hope that wasn't more confusing, rather than less confusing.

I'd like, though, to address the idea that no rational person should believe in God. That's quite a claim, and probably leads to the murky waters of definitions; definitions of rational, should, believe, and God.

Let me assume that your definition of rational doesn't preempt someone who believes in God. (I doubt anyone here is that question-begging.) If that's the case, I think there's a fairly rational argument for the existence of God. It comes from Dr. Alvin Plantinga, of the University of Notre Dame. Dr. Plantinga, who's won numerous awards, fellowships, grants, and other elite academic paraphanelia, is probably an argument for rational people believing in God, because he's an example of a rational theist. But I'd hate to beg the question, too!

His argument is this:

1. A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W.

2. A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Notice that Plantinga's claim that a maximally great being exists in some possible world is equivalent to the claim that t the concept of a maximally great being is not self-contradictory. There is no logically possible world in which a square circle exists because the property of being square is inconsistent with the property of being circular.

So:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.

2. Therefore, there is at least one possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

4. If a maximally great being exists in one possible world, it exists in every possible world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being (God) exists in every logically possible world.

I suppose there's a hidden assumption that this world is logically possible. I will leave disproving that assumption as an exercise for the reader.

--Joey

[Dan6814]

David: I'd love to carry this out, and I would if I wasn't headed to Slovakia in a few hours. Maybe some other time.

JoeCool: There are a couple of flaws in Plantinga's argument. First, David would certainly argue that the 1st step of the argument is wrong. It's not self-consistent, because besides the predicates of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection, There is also the condition that evil exists in the world. Since (according to David's argument) evil's existence negates the possbility of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being, a maximally great being is not self-consistent.

Second, and the one I believe in more strongly, is that Plantinga's proof begs the question harcore. For a being to be "maximally excellent," it must exist. (Kant actually argues the opposite in response to Anselm's ontological proof, but since I think Kant's arguments about actual and conceptual existence [which I can't quote back here because, quite frankly, it's been a while] are right, I'm assuming that actual existence is necessary to be maximally excellent to foreclose all logical possibilities.) For a being to be "Maximally Great," it must be maximally excellent in all worlds. In other words, if a being is maximally great, it has as a precondition its existence in every possible world, including the "at least one" he mentions later. So, in order to conceive of a "maximally great" being, we have to assume about it that it exists everywhere. But if I reject the premise that it exists everywhere, then there need not exist such a maximally great being, since its existence would not be self-consistent -- in other words, if I don't assume that he exists everywhere, then the definition loses all meaning. Plantinga assumes that God exists everywhere in order to say that his "maximally great being" is self-consistent, and thus begs the question.

If this is convoluted, sorry; I'm really interested in all this, and I might write a thesis on it, but there are hundreds of miles to go before I sleep.

Dan

[joecool12321]

Dan: "[T]he 1st step of the argument is wrong. It's not self-consistent, because besides the predicates of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection..."

I'll have to look back again, but I don't think I've ever heard the argument that omniscience is self-contradictory. As for the contradictory nature of omnipotence, I addressed why the presented argument fails. I may be wrong, but you have to show me in what way my answer fails.

"Since (according to David's argument) evil's existence negates the possbility of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being, a maximally great being is not self-consistent."

Well, David simply asserts that, "If a diety is all-powerful, then it should be able to create a perfect world without any suffering. If a diety is all-loving, then it should want to create a world without suffering."

I don't think I see any reason why that is actually the case. So I'm not convinced there's a contradiction.

Your second section was a little harder for me to follow, but let me give it a stab. Let me know if I miss something.

All I really need is to know that T is not self-contradictory. That means that my premise is rational. If my premise is rational, even if everyone doesn't believe it, a rational person could believe it.

"Plantinga assumes that God exists everywhere in order to say that his "maximally great being" is self-consistent, and thus begs the question."

No, Plantinga defines a maximally great being as one who is maximally excellent in every possible world. Since that definition is not logically contradictory, it exists in a possible world (just as a unicorn exists in a possible world). Hence, because a maximally great being exists in a possible world, it exists in every possible world.

"But if I reject the premise that it exists everywhere..."

I suppose you could deny the definition of maximally great, but that's your call. You don't show me why I should have to reject it. Thus, the definition is still rational, and a rational person could follow that argument and (if they wanted) be justified in their belief from rational premises.

Remember that Plantinga isn't arguing for a logical proof, but a rational proof of God's existence. That is, he's looking for an argument that any rational person could believe, not an argument that every rational person should believe.

--Joey