Debate vs. "real life"

[Eagle of Meaux]

Jed made a comment on another thread that got me thinking. How much of what we argue, on the critical level, can we, or do we transition over to "real life?"
Perhaps I'm alone, but I believe the critique level of debate to one of the most meaningful parts of the activity. The reason I ascribe such a high degree of meaning to it is that the concepts and ideals we debate there can transition through to the non-debate world. If any of the pre-fiat analysis I've been making over the past few years is true, then the ideals we argue and support in a critical form ought to be applicable to all that we do. This is not to say we ought believe every argument we make, but it is to say that critical arguments ought have application, or at least be debated within our daily lives and not dismissed as something that should be regulated to the debate realm alone.

Y'all's thoughts?

Keith

[tutakai]

Well, to whatever extent that grad school is "real life" I can state that introduction to critical theory is extremely useful preparation. I wish critical theory in debate, as expressed through the critiques presented in rounds, weren't so frequently shallow as it currently seems to be.

[USC MissingLink]

I will defend my distinction between debate and real life for a number of reasons.

First, I think it's just silly to assume that any argument made in a debate round really has any effect outside of that debate round. This is one of my biggest issues with kritiks. There's an assumption that somehow the ballot really is a voice or an advocacy of a certain position. For me, however, losing a kritik doesn't give me pause later to think oh, wow, i should be more careful about whatever. Instead it makes me think darn, i shoulda made this argument or that argument to beat this think.

Second, kritiks are often produced in-round with the intent of winning a debate. This, for me, undermines their credibility since they are not being advocated in good faith. Like another thread where I've made this point, I think a kritik often looks too hard to be offended - reads too much into language which is not necessarily there. For example, if someone runs a case advocating equality for sexual minorities, and refers to those getting rights as "gay" and "they." I've seen opp kritiks of this position as othering and ignoring other sexual minorities. Personally, I think that such a kritik, while it may win argumentatively in the debate if the gov team mis-handles it, is missing the overall intention of the case. The fact is that case proper makes it fairly clear that the gov team supports equality and so to accuse them of using language that undermines equality is wrong. They used the wrong words, but their intent is fairly clear. My point here is that people look too hard for links to thier kritiks.

Third, a kritik is never going to change a mind-set. All you can do is challenge the language that is used. Sure, a debater may be more careful not to use the word "gay" next time, but if there is really a mindset at work (which the kritik seeks to change) the kritik is doing nothing to cure that mindset. Instead, it's merely driving it underground and asking that it be masked by "safe" language. In other words, you can't eliminate racism by making sure that no one says racist things.

Finally, I'm concerned with associating debate with real life because often times debaters take positions in a debate round that they disagree with soundly in real life. For me personally, nearly every position I ever argued was offensive to my personal world view. It would be unfair to assume that my arguments should carry over into real life. Since I was trying to win a debate, I was not necessarily presenting the whole picture but rather only the parts that helped my case. Therefore, by necessity, the content of a debate round is skewed.

As has been discussed here before, the debate community tends to be very liberal, so it makes sense to me that most liberals would want to think that the liberal arguments made in debates apply to real life. When they look around and see every debater making liberal arguments too, and other judges voting on liberal issues thier belief in the real-world impacts are reified. In fact, however, there is a broader political variety out there. It's just silenced in the name of winning.

jEd

[DreinCali]

Hear hear Jed, especially on the "ballot is a voice" thing. Man am I glad I don't debate anymore, so I can say how tooooootally stupid this stuff is. Like when I ran T and the dude said I was trying to "silence his voice" and stop people from talking about how we should dissolve the military or something. Please. And several times I've heard people go on these things about "real-world impacts" or "in-round" v. "out-of round" impacts where I got the idea that they were telling the judge that everyone in the room was being brainwashed or oppressed, right now, and would be, unless they won the kritik and the round. What? How? It's so silly to me to think that 1)experienced debaters and judges are really going to change much from one kritik in one round or, even better 2) people NOT in the round are going to, like, get wind of the kritik and decision and go "Wow. Maybe I shouldn't say ___ anymore. It hurts people." The closest anything would even come to that is, as Jed says, people may change their competitive tactics (if say, a certain kritik gets real trendy.)
So I like the idea of a critique as it applies to case debate- saying the philosophy or assumptions of case actually counters what the gov team wants to accomplish. That's a cool and interesting debate. But as far as "real-world" impacts of debate rounds on the competitors, judges, etc...ehhh....I haven't seen it. Maybe when I see a bunch of kritiks lose, and then oppression and hate run rampant the next tournament, and the original kritik-runners going "I told you so!", I'll reconsider....hehe.

Andrea

p.s. props on the "good faith" matter too. no need to repeat, Jed's right :)

[tutakai]

One of the problems with many so-called "kritiks" in debate jargon is that they are exactly what Jed decried -- shallow arguments engineered to appeal to what is often believed to be the dominant political prejudices of the judging pool.

But one should not necessarily equate the "kritik" with the critique. The "kritik" is, as Jed observed, just a game-playing device that IS often lacking in depth or credibility.

But the critique is a long-standing part of philosophy and political analysis going back to at least Marx and Kant. Critiques force people to look at underlying assumptions and to ask the question of whether a policy or a system really delivered what it claims to deliver (normatively speaking).

Unfortunately for debate, the "kritik" is constrained by the "arms race" of the game. Real critiques require very deep analysis and the drawing of careful distinctions. They also require wrestling with often contradictory values and problems. There are no easy answers in the world of critiques.

But "kritiks" are frequently about easy answers -- paste a label on something and then ask for the ballot based on the supposed "real world impact". Because of the need to cover line-by-line responses on an expanding flow, debaters can usually not afford to invest the time needed to really develop a nuanced critique. Debate, particularly flow debate, is reductionist in the extreme.

BUT all that being said, there is an opening for the critique to replace the "kritik". Within the blizzard of "kritiks" I have, over the past few years, seen a few examples of geuine critiques that are invested with the thought, effort, and depth of analysis to not only warrrant a ballot but also to serve as a avenue for preparation in other forms of academic pursuit (such as grad school).

I know I with I had known more of Habermas when I was debating than I did at the time. Actual Habermas turned out to be much more nuanced and robust than that found in the "Habermas kritiks" I had heard in debate. And, had it been presented as a critique instead of a "kritik", it would have been a REALLY good debate....

[pattybar]

Ok... so Debate does not equal real life..... gee, I thought debate WAS real life... (but, look who I'm married to :) )...

Actually, the value of debate to a person's real life will vary, but the key is not that there are some sort of "real" impacts to arguments etc... at that level it is all a bunch of hooey... For startes, as a judge I'm not able to actually DO any of the things a typical debate round empowers me to do....

But, how participating in debate helps students is a real impact, thus the reason I'm working so hard to start debate at my new university.

So, this all comes down to the level of "real" to which you would like to refer... "debate-real"is as artifical and often as shallow as some of th argumentatin... but "real-real" measures the actual impacts on student's lives....

Patty

[USC MissingLink]

I agree with Jason about the distinction between a kritik and a critique. However, I still question whether a debate round is a proper forum for a critique. Since the debate atmosphere is competative, the critique is not run in good faith, but rather to win a ballot. Additionally, it may be challenging ideas that the individuals in the debate community don't really hold, but are arguing in the context of the debate round. Additionally, even if such a critique is successfully run, it's silly to assume that the judge's ballot supports it and somehow causes it to morph from an abstract idea in a debate round to a true indict of the "real world".

The problem isn't the content. The problem is the forum.

jEd

[NonEcdicus]

Since the debate atmosphere is competative, the critique is not run in good faith, but rather to win a ballot. If this argument were really intended to support eliminating a whole type of argument from debate rounds, then all of debate would have to be abolished, since it is not at all unique to kritiks. Additionally, even if such a critique is successfully run, it's silly to assume that the judge's ballot supports it and somehow causes it to morph from an abstract idea in a debate round to a true indict of the "real world".It seems to me that this is only one way to impact a Kritik argument in a debate round, and agreed it may be the silliest, because it is unrealistic (and personally I think all arguments in debate rounds should strive to be as realistic as possible, for a variety of reasons). But, to be fair, aren't there a whole lot of other ways to impact Kritiks in a more realistic way?

[USC MissingLink]

Oh, please don't get me wrong. I think kritiks, in a debate round, are fun and valuable. I just think that if we really believe that they have "real world" impacts then we are fooling ourselves.

jEd

[joecool12321]

When they look around and see every debater making liberal arguments too, and other judges voting on liberal issues thier belief in the real-world impacts are reified. In fact, however, there is a broader political variety out there. It's just silenced in the name of winning.You reminded me of something Chesterfield said. It was something like, "If you can engage people's pity, pride, love, or ambiotion, you need not fear what their reason can do against you."

--Joey

[Eagle of Meaux]

I might challenge the idea that critiques do not have real world impacts. As an example, I think a reduction in sexist language within the debate community has been brought about partly because of critiques.

Keith

[USC MissingLink]

I think a reduction in sexist language within the debate community has been brought about partly because of critiquesAn interesting claim that perhaps diserves more attention.

Firstly, you assume that there is value in reducing the amount of sexist language. I contend that unless there is a paralelled reduction in sexist attitudes such a reduction is actually counterproductive. It just serves to hide the reality of the problem that still exists.

Secondly, said arguments exist solely because they can win debates. While we may like to think that the debaters making the arguments come from an egalatarian mindset, the only reason they make the argument is that it will win them a ballot. This actually comodifies the ideas being forwarded, which undermines thier true value. People are careful not to use sexist rhetoric not because they care about the implications of thier language but because they are afraid that if they slip and use the language they will lose a debate. If you don't believe this, just observe out-of-round rhetoric between debaters.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, since this sort of argumentation has proven sucessful, debaters often accuse eachother of sexist rhetoric where none actually exists. They are desperate to find links to thier kritiks. Thus, useful language is kritiked and silenced. Good ideas are marginalized because of a slip-of-tongue.

jEd

[Eagle of Meaux]

while I may risk crucifixion for this I'm going to suggest that the CEDA community is a better model for this that the parli community because these sorts of critiques have been active much longer in CEDA and have had the opportunity to show their actual effectiveness. this will be important on the second argument Jed makes. With that in mind, the line by line. :)

First argument

A very classic and very astute turn to a language critique. However whether stifling sexist language is good or bad is irrelevant to my point that the critique is achieving it's goals; good or bad. I'll be happy to argue the validity of a language critique with you in a different forum and I think I'll actually end up strongly on your side, but in this case I don't think it answers back my argument that this critique has made an impact.

2nd argument

Here I have a few responses;
1. why they're used doesn't disprove their effectiveness
2. I think you make an overly broad generalization when you say "the only reason they make the argument is that it will win them a ballot." There are some who raise the issue because they believe in it, AND because it wins a ballot, and there are some who raise critiques they know they will lose on, yet advocate because they believe the issue must be raised.
3. Here I might appeal to the CEDA community just a bit. in my experience sexist rhetoric that is not intended in an ironic fashion (a whole different topic we can get into elsewhere or elsewhen (I highly doubt that's a word)) is chastised and repressed. This would seem to suggest that out of round discourse suggests the reverse in communities where such critiques are more prevalent, and more widely accepted.

3rd Argument

Also an interesting attack on the legitimacy of the critique, but not a response to the proliferation of its effects.

I still believe that rhetoric in the community has changed because of the language critique, for better or worse; and that proves that all of those "make your ballot count" shpeals might not be completely bankrupt, and some of it may be able to transition through to our daily lives.

Keith

[joecool12321]

Keith,

What? Your post hardly made any sense. No one here is interested in "winning" an argument. This is where you get to talk about what you really think, outside of a round. No judge is giving you a win or Jed a loss. Your pseudo answers, therefore, don't make a lot of sense.

First, Jed argues (I think correctly) that critiques only affect in-round rhetoric. Thus, they aren't effective in the real world. This core issue is unanswered. Of course critique affect in-round rhetoric, just like if you shocked a dog when it barked, it would stop barking. But that doesn't mean it's not a dog.

Then you start talking about how critiques are bad, but effective. Jed's merely pointing out that said critiques don't really affect the community because to truly affect someone means to make a change in their underlying value structure. Critiques don't do this.

I think, then, the argument that critiques do not affect the real world, and the argument that critiques mask issues in-round, are both true.

--Joey

[Eagle of Meaux]

Joey,

I do get into “debate mode” too much sometimes, and I’m sorry if my post made little sense because of it. What I originally asked was if critiques are applicable in a non-debate environment. It was argued that this transition could not occur for “even if such a critique is successfully run, it's silly to assume that the judge's ballot supports it and somehow causes it to morph from an abstract idea in a debate round to a true indict of the "real world". My response was to argue – by way of a sexist language critique example – that this has already happened within the community. The proximate goal of a sexist language critique is to reduce the use of sexist language. Jed’s 1st and 3rd responses mainly seemed to argue the value of such a reduction not whether such a reduction occurred or not. His second argument seemed to address both the intension of debaters in running these critiques, and whether or not their suppression of sexist language transitioned into debater’s rhetoric out of round. This is where the CEDA example came it. I argue that in the CEDA community such a reduction has occurred, even if it has not in the parli community (and the Audrey’s post on the issue of the rhetoric of the poll suggests that the issue is in flux within our community). I use the sexist language critique merely as an example of a critique which has proliferated to illustrate the possibility of such proliferation, not to make a normative assessment on the value of the critique.

>Then you start talking about how critiques are bad, but effective. Jed's merely pointing out that said critiques don't really affect the community because to truly affect someone means to make a change in their underlying value structure. Critiques don't do this.<

I don’t at any time claim critiques are bad. I simply argue that whether a sexist language critique actually is a good argument or not it achieves its proximate goal of squelching, or at least limiting, the use of sexist language. This discussion is not intended to determine whether certain critiques are good or bad, it’s merely designed to discuss whether or not critiques ought be considered within our daily lives.

Does that clarify things a bit?
And what “psudo-argument[s]” am I making?

Keith

[USC MissingLink]

Let me clarify my first and third arguments breifly (and this also applies to the second). I am acknowledging that a sexist kritik can have very real effects on the rhetoric of a debate round. But my contention is that this effect remains confined within the debate, and that the only reason the rhetoric is silence within the debate is that mis-speaking can cost the debater a win.

I base this assertion on the experiences and discussion I was involved in while still a competitor. People are welcome to correct me here; I am speaking from my personal experience which may be skewed because I was always clear that I wouldn't be offended by "loose lips." My experience, though, in both Policy and Parli circles was that most students were much less careful about thier language when there wasn't the risk of offending a judge/coach. In other words, when there's no one around who can penalize their rhetoric with a ballot, the viewpoints of the sexism kritik go away. Now, granted, this isn't universally the case; but I don't think that the kritik makes any difference. Those who take offense would take offense anyway, and those who could care less aren't going to change thier minds.

jEd

[pattybar]

Hey all,

I think this is a fascinating discussion...

It seems to me that there are a couple of issues at work here.

1) The actual impact of sexism kritiques: Sems to actually happen on two levels... a) the in-round language changes, thus in-round thought should follow (although we can never know if it actually does) b1) the out of round language, for a smaller number, also changes. OR b2) the kritique is mocked and sexist jokes etc are a part of the mocking...

2) Not believing what you are saying: There are two schools of thought on this within debate. One school says that debate is an exercise designed to, among other things, get you to see all sides of an issue -- as such, the one who can see their side best is the winner. The other side says that you should find a way to argue only what you believe, and when you find that way, you will win. I've known successful teams on both sides of this division.

The interesting part of being a judge is trying to guess where someone actually stands on this division...

Patty

[ML]

My thoughts:

As a "comm", "ie", and "generally reviled" critic, (who despite all hardship and disadvantaged upbringing has actually managed to learn how to flow!), I think the critical level of debate is just dandy. I actually managed to get through a little bit of Habermas during my undergrad sentence, and so am always interested in seeing how he and similarly confusing foreign po-mo philosophers manage to get name-dropped in rounds.
Sadly, as many on this thread have pointed out, the names aren't all that get dropped. Good analysis and reasonable interpretation and understanding often get dropped as well. I wish people would spend more time reading and discussing their K generators, because that's where much of the true value of critical debate lies.

As for real-world impacts: I agree that there is a potential for changing mindsets, or at least heightening sensitivity to language. It was through interaction with debate that I learned the negative connotation to the Romany people associated with the word "Gip" (as in, "You stood in line for two days for Attack of the Clones tickets? You got ___'ed.") As a result, I've consciously made an attempt to *not* use it in casual speech. Chalk one up for real world impact.

However, I've also seen this taken to ridiculous extremes for the sake of the win. I think gendered language is actually a really good example. The power of language has its limits. (As a "woman", I don't really give a damn what you want to call me, as long as I'm making as much as everyone else per hour and don't always get stuck making coffee) While the policy debate community has certainly embraced the language K, I think they've also pushed it out to a level that is careless, and perhaps even a bit stifling to discourse. It's one thing to kritik someone's own language, (ie "the impact to this is Taiwan bending over and taking it from China") or question the validity of a source because of its grounding in patriarchal exclusionist thought. It's another to out-and-out tell the judge to reject/not read this critical piece of evidence because the author made use of "chairman" instead of "chair" or mistakingly used "he" one too many times as a pronoun. Does that mean the content of the evidence is as "wedded" to the patriarchy as the language? Maybe. But that question often gets missed in the zeal to call your opposition out on it. It's gotten to the point where if anyone steps on you for a gendered language K in the policy community, all you can really say is, "sorry, won't let it happen again." and hope no one notices quite so much. Not much discourse going on there....

The point is, in the real world, sometimes people make sexist comments or use gendered language because they really think women are inferior. Sometimes they just do it out of habit or because they don't know any better. I'd rather we reserve our energies to go after the people who continue to perpetuate *policies* of inequity than alienate people who use careless speech but would otherwise support the challenge of those policies. That's why I wish I could see more Feminist IR criticism in rounds, as opposed to criticism of people's language. Much of the mindset and structure of our security and development discourse, (to say nothing of how we linguistically construct the idea of the "nation-state" and "state to state" relations) is grounded in hegemonic, and therefore it can be argued, patriarchal thought. Let's attack the real-world impacts of how "we" (the academics, policy-makers AND those of us in debate rounds who study these folks) realize abstract concepts in a gendered framework, and stop looking for tiny things to seize on to win the ballot.

Ack, release the hounds....
ML

[Western Amy]

OK, ML never remebers this when i remind her, but I'm going to mention it anyway, because I think it's a great example of real world imapcts.

(BTW, even though i'm over on the other thread completeley misconstruing Jason's arguments, I do want to send out an edict from this cultist that ML is not so reviled as she would like)

As a junior debater (with a different partner than the one who many of you have heard of, who I'll call K in this instance), I had a round on vouchers with ML in the back of the room. K got very impassioned about what he was saying and stated that with vouchers, public schools "get the shaft." I barely noticed this, but after it was over, ML came up and mentioned it to us, discussing the imagery that that expression conjures up and how it can fall into a mode of sexual violence being used to perpetuate stereotypes. I found it interesting, as this was something which had never crossed my mind, and i have also made an effort to eliminate that term from my speech. Given that we were fresh-faced junior debaters, we didn't have a K run on us, but still the opportunity to discuss something like that has made an impact in the real-world as well.

[ML]

I do vaguely remember this...I'm not *that* old and forgetful... :) and I do think it's a good example of a real world impact. But there's a subtle contextual difference between my mentioning of Amy's partners' language, and some of the egregious examples i mentioned earlier. First of all, it didn't come up as an issue from their opponants in the round, so I didn't/couldn't vote on it. Secondly, I approached them after the round was over, and asked them to rethink their usage of phrases that originated as descriptions of potentially sexually violent acts. (note that in my post above, I use a similar example: "Taiwan bending over and taking it" to delineate the difference between reasonable and questionable language critiques) So yeah, I do think there's real-world impacts to making ourselves sound better and less offensive/casual/careless with whatever our primary language of choice may be, but I also think sometimes people take it way too far. And that cheapens the power of the critical debate as well as making people feel alienated and pissy. Which is never good.

Thanks for the reminder Amy...
ML

[ML]

I do vaguely remember this...I'm not *that* old and forgetful... :) and I do think it's a good example of a real world impact. But there's a subtle contextual difference between my mentioning of Amy's partners' language, and some of the egregious examples i mentioned earlier. First of all, it didn't come up as an issue from their opponants in the round, so I didn't/couldn't vote on it. Secondly, I approached them after the round was over, and asked them to rethink their usage of phrases that originated as descriptions of potentially sexually violent acts. (note that in my post above, I use a similar example: "Taiwan bending over and taking it" to delineate the difference between reasonable and questionable language critiques) So yeah, I do think there's real-world impacts to making ourselves sound better and less offensive/casual/careless with whatever our primary language of choice may be, but I also think sometimes people take it way too far. And that cheapens the power of the critical debate as well as making people feel alienated and pissy. Which is never good.

Thanks for the reminder Amy...
ML

[Samopolis]

One of the problems with many so-called "kritiks" in debate jargon is that they are exactly what Jed decried -- shallow arguments engineered to appeal to what is often believed to be the dominant political prejudices of the judging pool.
On this note, is there anyone out there besides me developing/arguing critiques grounded in conservative philosophy? All the ones I've encountered thus far have been leftist in nature.

[scooter]

Sam: I have to actually differ with you that Conservative arguments are antithetical to Parli. Indeed, I would argue they are actually becoming more common. No, I am not talking the stereotypical, Conservative right wing extremism (a la, my buddy Jimmy Dobson, Rev. Phelps, et. al).

Instead, I would argue that, if we were to assume that writers such as D'Souza are indeed Conservative (which I think that both of us, and he, would contend) I am seeing more and more arguments that purport similar contentions as he (mainly, more critism concerning notions of victimage rhetoric, the questioning of the role of statism, the meaning of the "individual"-- indeed, all classic aspects of a conservative ideology).

In short, more common? Depends on the definition of conservative. But in some elements: Yes, not in extremist means (thankfully) but yes, some elements of conservatism are indeed there-- which for some of us is a very positive thing.

Here is where I wonder: "Ahhh hell, another election-- what party do I like again?!?"

S

P.S.: Grad students well fed? Dude, I missed that gravy train on its run through MA land...

[stannard67]

Whether critical or philosophical positions are grounded in the soft-left critical theory of french deconstruction or poststructuralism; primordially fascist heideggerian anti-technology meditation (including spanos); libertarianism ala Rand or neoconservatism; regardless of the "political" orientation of philosophical criticism, you might notice that all such positions ignore issues of class, economics, and materiality. Bourgeois humanism and bourgeois anti-humanism are two sides of the same coin, because they represent two factions of the same privileged class. Historically, both neoconservatism and poststructuralism have emerged and flourished in times of great economic divisions and waves of crises in capital. Both serve to "explain away" poorness and economic malaise; in one instance by blaming the poor for being poor, and in the other instance by asserting that text and discourse are all that really matter.

stannard

[tutakai]

>Bourgeois humanism and bourgeois anti-humanism are two
>sides of the same coin, because they represent two factions
>of the same privileged class.

Then again, the taxonomies of "class" tend to create exclusionary frameworks and assumptions of normative objectivity that are problematic to many scholars.

Indeed, such frameworks tend to subtly designate a normatively priveleged "class" (with which the author identifies) and thus reify structural forms of oppression even while supposedly advocating for the overthrow of systems bearing such characteristics.

(Academic-language-free version: Marxist critiquers of "class privilege" are hypocritical.)

Grad Student Deconstructs Take-Out Menu -- The Onion (http://www.theonion.com/onion3826/grad_student.html)

[stannard67]

Jason writes:
>>>
Then again, the taxonomies of "class" tend to create exclusionary frameworks and assumptions of normative objectivity that are problematic to many scholars.

Indeed, such frameworks tend to subtly designate a normatively priveleged "class" (with which the author identifies) and thus reify structural forms of oppression even while supposedly advocating for the overthrow of systems bearing such characteristics.

(Academic-language-free version: Marxist critiquers of "class privilege" are hypocritical.)
>>>

1. Doesn't answer my original argument. My original argument was not to privilege one class over another, either blatantly or subtly. My original argument was that postmodern, poststructuralist, or libertarian criticism tends to IGNORE class, materiality, and the role of economics in contextualizing the construction of reality.

2. This argument doesn't make any normative judgments about the desirability of capitalism, socialism, or any economic system. It simply points out that which is ignored in many contemporary varieties of critical theory. See:

Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 198:cool: 270-295.

Celeste Condit Railsback, “Beyond Rhetorical Relativism: A Structural-Material Model of Truth and Objective Reality,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983): 351-363.

Dana L. Cloud, “The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric,” The Western Journal of Communication 58 (1994): 141-163.

Dana L. Cloud, “Get a Little Class,” paper presented at the Western States Communication Association annual convention, Vancouver, British Columbia, 22 February 1999.

3. Insofar as there is any privileging of economically marginalized groups in Marxist theory, Marxist scholars are unapologetic in their assertion of the "objectivity" of material reality. (Just because they believe reality is objective doesn't mean they claim their own standpoint is objective). In other words, Marxists are realists, and will defend that controversial ontological view. Moreover, those scholars who deny objective material reality ontologically (in favor of discursive determinism, rhetoric-centered or ideological-centered views of reality, e.g. Baudrillard) do not justify their ontologies, but instead proceed from the assumption that all reality is discursively constructed--an assumption that, I maintain, is much easier to hold if you are materially privileged than if you are poor.

4. Most Marxist scholars are equally unapologetic in their normative/methodological preferences:

"The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from that of the ruling class; it is also epistemically advantageous. It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive. It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population, the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in that historical period. Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them."
-Alison M. Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993): 370-371.

Thus, even if the "objective material reality" cited by Marxist scholars is actually one of many "subjective" constructs and standpoints, that's okay, because at least it's a standpoint that attempts to represent the living conditions of human agents in a material field shared by the majority of humanity--and I acknowledge the problematic nature of that statement, and am willing to try to tease out more clear meanings and flesh out more clear arguments as this discussion continues.

stannard

[tutakai]

Matt,

While many of your points are interesting, you are avoiding direct response to my charge of Marxist hypocrisy. To put the question somewhat crudely, what makes Marxist scholars ensconced in the priveleged realm of academia believe that they can accurate perceive, let alone represent, the real perceptions and normative preferences of a "class" that they claim to represent?

Indeed, what warrants the assumptions that the "class" can be fairly treated as a group with similar interests and normative preferences in the first place?

Marxist scholars usually assume that any deviation from within the class is a result of "false consciousness" but rarely even address the underlying assumption that they have objective knowledge of a "true consciousness". Instead, they arrogantly and hypocritically project their own perceptions and normative preferences OUT of their priveleged status and ONTO the "class" they claim to represent.

Even aside from the inherent arrogance of this projection, the normative consequence of this process is to discursively demean the subject class by stripping them of both individual and collective voices in favor of the priveleged voice of the academician.

Thus, academic marxism is itself a system of domination, even while hypocritcally pretending to represent the interests of a "lower" class. (The demeaning nature of this label is another potential source of critique that I, for now, will leave unaddressed.)

Academic marxism is more about protecting the interests of academic marxists than fulfilling the real aspirations of the billions of underpriveleged throughout the world.

[USC MissingLink]

<img src=http://www.net-benefits.net/emoticons/hearhear.gif ALT=":hear">

I've not been reading this thread religiously, but I have 2 cents on this last post...

Ironically, this is almost the exact criticism I use when I criticize the Democratic Party. Intellectuals claim to represent the disenfranchised by arguing that they have the best ideas, but in the very act of claiming to be representative of a class they set themselves apart and above the very classes that they claim they are trying to help.

I don't think that this is malicious or even conscious. My guess is that most democrats really think they are helping. My criticism is, however that thier actions which try to help actually disempower. They remove the ability of these classes to help themselves and instead position themselves as the necessary arbiteur of aid.

jEd

[stannard67]

I am loving this conversation, Jason.

Now I see that your chief point was that academic marxists are privileged, and that renders their criticism of bourgeois scholarship hypocritical. Does this mean white scholars cannot criticize white privilege? Or that male academics cannot criticize patriarchy without being hypocritical? This still doesn't answer my original argument, that postmodern, poststructuralist, and libertarian criticism tend to ignore materiality, wealth and poverty, and economic contexts in their criticisms. It doesn't even take a Marxist to spot this. :)

On the issue of "academic marxism:" I agree that there are "armchair marxists" who write about privilege and poverty in a rather shallow way. In that sense, you are correct on the noncontroversial point that deconstructing privilege from a position of privilege is paradoxical. I wouldn't call those folks very good Marxists. But I think it's a hasty generalization to call Marx himself, or any of his leading followers "academics," or to denigrate Marxist criticism as somehow being hypocritically academic. Rather than being informed exclusively by academic elitism, Marx (who never held an academic post) located his context in his career as socialist spokesman and organizer. In fact, like other movement leaders, he may have been spending too much time propagandizing to fully articulate his theory of propaganda. In other words, his chief failing in the eyes of many of his academic critics was that he wasn't academic enough! Given that neither Marx nor Engels (nor Lenin, Trotsky, Eugene Debs, Emma Goldman, Rosa Luxembourg, Che Guevara, or James Cannon) were academics, the charge that Marxism is overly informed by bourgeois academic privilege is suspect. These perople were involved in a movement, and their followers have been members of all social classes, not merely the academic bourgeoisie. Even if some of the followers of these revolutionary thinkers were academics, this does not in itself mean that Marxism is a philosophy “by and for intellectuals” (as many besides Jason have contended).

The intellectual arrogance you describe is not found in marxist activism. It was, however, largely apparent in the non-academic, shallow rigidity of Stalinism. It is easy to see what interests Stalin and his gang were protecting. It's more difficult for me to see the interests that the "academic marxists" are protecting. Especially since there are so few of us, and our jobs are far from secure (and I assure you, our materiality is less than privileged!).

So let's think for a moment about what an "academic" worker is. See, Marxism isn't about rich and poor per se, so much as about the role of various individuals in the productive roles of society. Most academics have some material privilege, but they don't own their own means of production; the majority of "workers" in academia are grad students and lecturers who make little money and are subject to dismissal largely at their bosses' whims. Even tenured professors are "workers" rather than owners. Assuming that a worker making $60K per year is somehow less qualified to critique capitalism than a worker making $30K per year is a grossly oversimplified characterization of Marxist activism OR criticism.

Finally, many Marxist (and non-marxist) academic workers are also activists. They work as advocates for the poor, for unions, for prison reform, etc. All critical theory needs to be informed by practice to be worth anything, and that's true whether you're a feminist critic, a member of the CLS movement, a fighter for racial justice, a gay rights advocate, a libertarian, or a Marxist.

Again, I make no conclusive "I am smarter than you" kind of arguments here--this post is not an invitation to finality in this conversation.

It's just that, in a sense, I think you're missing the point, Jason: Marxist academics are not hypocritical by criticizing the blind spots of bourgeois scholarship, and the notion of "class" is not some fixed and rigid attempt to create divisions where none exist. Instead, as I see it, Marxists are currently trying to fight against postmodernist politics of difference by emphasizing the fundamental same-ness of all people who work, eat, produce, and consume. This is more than a mere theoretical difference. Because we all have the same challenges in life:

"the need to sell one’s labor power, increasingly under physically and psychologically degrading conditions, is the one unifying experience across age, ethnic, gender and status lines. That was Marx’s insight into capitalist alienation. It remains the moral basis for socialism. But it also possesses a practical, rhetorical, and political basis." (James Arnt Aune, Rhetoric and Marxism Boulder: Westview P, 1994, p. 147).

I am not preaching socialism on this thread, but I am defending the viability of Marxist criticism, which at the very least is defensible as one more category of criticism, and at most tends to cut across all forms of criticism because it deals with the one universal feature of human existence: economy.

If you still buy into the dichotomy, however, and want to see "non-academic" marxism in action, let me know, and I'll assemble a list of links, newsletters, and events.

stannard

[tutakai]

>Now I see that your chief point was that academic marxists
>are privileged, and that renders their criticism of bourgeois
>scholarship hypocritical. Does this mean white scholars
>cannot criticize white privilege? Or that male academics
>cannot criticize patriarchy without being hypocritical?

No, it only means they cannot claim to represent the interests of some other group when doing so. Criticizing elements present in one's own culture is distinct from claiming to represent another culture.

Even if we accept notions of "class" as being sufficiently descriptive of a group to warrant a claim of "class interests", it is not possible for someone outside that class to claim to accurately represent what those interests are. More seriously than this, however, academic marxists often go beyond trying to DESCRIBE class interests to attempting to PRESCRIBE interests for the "working class". Whenever I see allegations of "false consciousness", I scent a whiff of academic marxist hypocrisy and domination of the subject class.

>This still doesn't answer my original argument, that
>postmodern, poststructuralist, and libertarian criticism tend
>to ignore materiality, wealth and poverty, and economic
>contexts in their criticisms. It doesn't even take a Marxist to
>spot this.

Critiquing academic marxism does not impose upon me any obligation to defend any position on your list. Indeed, your list is not exhaustive of possible avenues of thought (for example, you say nothing about constructivist approaches which often DO include economic considerations along with cultural, social, political, racial, gender, sexual, and other identifies that marxist analysis ignores completely) nor is your charge of excluding economic considerations a NECESSARY component of any of the schools you do list. For example, even if many post-structuralists neglect economic components of analysis doesn't mean that ALL do so.

>But I think it's a hasty generalization to call Marx himself, or
>any of his leading followers "academics," or to denigrate
>Marxist criticism as somehow being hypocritically academic.

Perhaps I need to make a four-part distinction more clear:
1) Marx himself -- based on my limited exposure, Marx offers substantial insights into previously unrecognized assumptions about the nature of economics and the interaction of those with human dignity. However, I think Marx's analysis founders on epistemological problems with assumptions he makes when aggregating individuals and their interests into "classes".
2) Non-academic followers of Marx -- there are many subtypes of this, but the most relevant point to make about them is that they do not claim to represent or prescribe interests upon others but rather simply attempt to apply Marxist lines of thought in working towards some end. An illustrative example might be a trade unionist who, accepting elements of marxist thought, works towards establishing employee ownership of a company.
3) Academics influenced by marxist thought -- many in academia draw themes from Marx while accepting the need to also draw themes from other schools of thought. These academics recognize the limitations of one-dimensional economic determinism and the problematic aspects of making assumptions about individuals based on a meat-cleaver designation of "class". Nonetheless, these academics also recognize the usefulness of many of Marx's insights about relationships of economic power, the public/private sphere, etc.
4) Academic marxists -- at least some people, almost exclusively in academia, go the one objectionable step further and compound the errors mentioned above by claiming not only to know and represent the homogeneous interests of a "worker class" but also to arrogantly proclaim "false consciousness" whenever individuals from that "class" don't adhere to the academic's preferences or predictions about them.

#2 and #3 are what you later call "marxist activists". #4 is the main target of my critique.

>The intellectual arrogance you describe is not found in
>marxist activism. It was, however, largely apparent in the
>non-academic, shallow rigidity of Stalinism. It is easy to see
>what interests Stalin and his gang were protecting.

I disagree with any claim that it is NEVER found in "marxist activism" (at least how I would define that term). An academic who builds a career on academic marxist analysis has interests very distinct from that of the "class" he/she is claiming to represent. Indeed, those interests may well sometimes be in conflict with the subject "class".

>Most academics have some material privilege, but they don't
>own their own means of production; the majority
>of "workers" in academia are grad students and lecturers
>who make little money and are subject to dismissal largely
>at their bosses' whims. Even tenured professors
>are "workers" rather than owners. Assuming that a worker
>making $60K per year is somehow less qualified to critique
>capitalism than a worker making $30K per year is a grossly
>oversimplified characterization of Marxist activism OR
>criticism.

I have a couple of points here. First, your analogy stumbles on a common ground for marxist thought, namely that marxist thought is tied to an industrial way of economic thinking that only imperfectly translates to non-industrial modes of "working". Specifically, when the institution is publicly-owned, one could argue that the academics DO own the means of production as much as it is possible to do so (in a manner analogous to any socialist economy). The fact that there are "bosses" or managers of some type does not preclude worker ownership but is rather intrinsic to almost every possible organizational form.

But, on the other hand, there is an academic oligarchy of professors who control access to the field, so one COULD see them as analogous to the captialist "owners" Marx was concerned about. Indeed, the fact that some of those oligarchs are themselves marxists serves mostly to highlight the hypocrisy I am talking about -- many of the professors who function as gate-keepers over the grad students and untenured faculty are (if I accept your analogy) hypocritically claiming to represent and prescribe for the very same "working class" of grad students that they oppress. Ultimately, however, as a grad student, I find the "victim complex" you offer tempting emotionally but unsatisfying intellectually.

>It's just that, in a sense, I think you're missing the point,
>Jason: Marxist academics are not hypocritical by criticizing
>the blind spots of bourgeois scholarship, and the notion
>of "class" is not some fixed and rigid attempt to create
>divisions where none exist.

I disagree here. They ARE hypocritical if they seek to criticize blind spots in so-called "bourgeouis scholarship" (as label, not a true classification) while remaining willfully blind to or disattentive to the descriptive AND normative blind spots in their own paradigm.

And I think the congomeration of individuals into arbitrary "classes" conducts a disservice to the individuals that is oppressive in effect. It serves to strip those individuals of individual voices and replace them with the imposed voice of the academic who speaks on their behalf. Further, the ascription to individuals of characteristics based on the "class" to which they are assigned (by the academic) serves to strip individuals of even the right to construct and represent their own identity. The academic tells us who they are, where they are, what they want, and why they want it. No room is left for the actual members to say anything.

[stannard67]

>>>
No, it only means they cannot claim to represent the interests of some other group when doing so. Criticizing elements present in one's own culture is distinct from claiming to represent another culture.
>>>

1. Isn't "culture" just as problematic a term as "class?"
2. Okay, then if an Marxist in academia criticizes her own position of privilege, or elements within it, then she's not being hypocritical?

>>>
Even if we accept notions of "class" as being sufficiently descriptive of a group to warrant a claim of "class interests", it is not possible for someone outside that class to claim to accurately represent what those interests are.
>>>

1. See above
2. This seems problematic because it invites a kind of incommensurability and relativism based on people's standpoints. I can't EVER determine what might be in the interests of a group to which I don't belong? Just for specificity's sake, Jason, are you defending hard incommensurability?

>>>
More seriously than this, however, academic marxists often go beyond trying to DESCRIBE class interests to attempting to PRESCRIBE interests for the "working class". Whenever I see allegations of "false consciousness", I scent a whiff of academic marxist hypocrisy and domination of the subject class.
>>>

1. Do you also feel that way about feminists who employ the "false consciousness" thesis? What about Lacan or other psychoanalytic social critics? When Wilhelm Reich published "Mass Psychology of Fascism" while escaping Nazi Germany, was he dominating the subject class? Just want a delineation of how specific your charges are to Marxism.

2. I read contemporary Marxist writing, and honestly haven't seen the "false consciousness" thesis bandied about recently. I agree that it's a problematic term. At the same time, history is full of instances of populations acting against their objective self-interests (unless you are a hard historical relativist, and even then you'll run into problems concerning the differing interests and perspectives of factions within particular societies). Is there no room for a category of analysis that accounts for collective self-deception?

>>>
Critiquing academic marxism does not impose upon me any obligation to defend any position on your list. Indeed, your list is not exhaustive of possible avenues of thought (for example, you say nothing about constructivist approaches which often DO include economic considerations along with cultural, social, political, racial, gender, sexual, and other identifies that marxist analysis ignores completely) nor is your charge of excluding economic considerations a NECESSARY component of any of the schools you do list. For example, even if many post-structuralists neglect economic components of analysis doesn't mean that ALL do so.
>>>

1. I agree, and think that's a good thing. Moreover, I think Foucault does incorporate a bit of Marxism in "Discipline and Punish," at least, and when he does so, I find him more coherent than in his usual treatments of textual power. It's a good thing when scholars discuss economic contexts.

2. On the issue of "intersectional" categories of oppression, I think that critics who are intersectional are definitely moving in the right direction, but I also have issues with their own ontological framing of how these categories (race, gender, sexual orientation) exist, and whether socioeconomic status can be placed on the same ontological plain, or in the same methodology of categorization, than those other categories. But that's a tangent probably.

Next, you made a four-part distinction, with which I largely agree. Where I think we disagree is in your distinction between academic and non-academic, since I would rather place both under the general category of labor, and allow a later distinction between physical and mental labor--a distinction that retains the role of the teacher as laborer, but allows for differences in material context, which explains the odd and often weak and ineffective politics of academic radicals.

>>>
An academic who builds a career on academic marxist analysis has interests very distinct from that of the "class" he/she is claiming to represent. Indeed, those interests may well sometimes be in conflict with the subject "class".
>>>

1. You're partially right: their relative position of privilege, contextualized by their role in intellectual production, makes their interests SOMETIMES different than that of the very poor.

2. But I think you're narrowing the scope of hypocritical analysis to a very small part of the overall Marxist project. Again, can an academic Marxist, without hyprocrisy, critique the class divisions within academia? Can academic Marxists analyze the role of various types of academic discourse in the overall reproduction of ideological hegemony? What is off-limits, and what is allowed?

>>>
I have a couple of points here. First, your analogy stumbles on a common ground for marxist thought, namely that marxist thought is tied to an industrial way of economic thinking that only imperfectly translates to non-industrial modes of "working". Specifically, when the institution is publicly-owned, one could argue that the academics DO own the means of production as much as it is possible to do so (in a manner analogous to any socialist economy). The fact that there are "bosses" or managers of some type does not preclude worker ownership but is rather intrinsic to almost every possible organizational form.
>>>

Point well-taken; although I don't think public institutions within market economies are completely analogous to socialist institutions--whatever we define the latter to be.

>>>
But, on the other hand, there is an academic oligarchy of professors who control access to the field, so one COULD see them as analogous to the captialist "owners" Marx was concerned about.
>>>

Once again, only partially analogous. Capitalists OWN the means of production. Managers control the access of workers to those productive forces. So I believe academic oligarchs are more analogous to managers than capitalists. There are important differences between the two that I don't need to get into right now.

>>>
Indeed, the fact that some of those oligarchs are themselves marxists serves mostly to highlight the hypocrisy I am talking about -- many of the professors who function as gate-keepers over the grad students and untenured faculty are (if I accept your analogy) hypocritically claiming to represent and prescribe for the very same "working class" of grad students that they oppress.
>>>

Agreed 100%, and not just Marxist professors, but any professor who professes some kind of liberatory pedagogy but then turns around and functions as a disciplinary gate-keeper. That's hypocrisy, and also evidence of some pretty messed-up social contradictions.

>>>
Ultimately, however, as a grad student, I find the "victim complex" you offer tempting emotionally but unsatisfying intellectually.
>>>

I don't offer a victim complex. Instead, I am pointing out the objective economic fact that grad students and lecturers do the majority of teaching, which provides income to the university, and yet are paid only a fraction of what full professors make. It is another instance of a division of labor in which those who do the profitable work fatten the wallets of those who do not.

>>>
I disagree here. They ARE hypocritical if they seek to criticize blind spots in so-called "bourgeouis scholarship" (as label, not a true classification) while remaining willfully blind to or disattentive to the descriptive AND normative blind spots in their own paradigm.
>>>

Yes, they are. As are any critics who do not self-reflect.

>>>
And I think the congomeration of individuals into arbitrary "classes" conducts a disservice to the individuals that is oppressive in effect. It serves to strip those individuals of individual voices and replace them with the imposed voice of the academic who speaks on their behalf. Further, the ascription to individuals of characteristics based on the "class" to which they are assigned (by the academic) serves to strip individuals of even the right to construct and represent their own identity. The academic tells us who they are, where they are, what they want, and why they want it. No room is left for the actual members to say anything.
>>>

1. I think you're being just a bit hyperbolic here. Some scholarship works that way, and some does not. All scholarship runs the risk of trying to "speak for the other," but NOT trying to do that ultimately means scholarship (at least in the social sciences) can deal with nothing but itself--intellectual masturbation, or as I like to call it, "thinking off."

2. We are not assigned to classes by academics. Economic existence is not a construct. It's an objective fact. The categories in question may sometimes merge or display their permeability; one may sometimes have a foot in the door of each class; rich people sometimes become poor and vice versa; but the fact remains that wealthy people tend to act and ideologize differently than poor people; that owners have different interests than workers; that the ideology of the very rich enjoys a disproportionate political advantage in class-divided societies. If I point this out, I don't think I'm a hypocrite.

3. Insofar as the Marxist academic's scholarship and criticism is not continually re-informed by deferential listening to individuals and groups in the classes they are writing about, and then synthesized into bottom-up theory-building, then you are right. And that's indefensible no matter what the label.

My prediction is that this discussion will boil down to the question of incommensurability and the question of Marxism's epistemic realism concerning economic existence. But we'll wait and see.

stannard

[tutakai]

1) As for incommensurability, I would argue that while one might be able to draw opinions about what might be in the interests of a group to which one is not a member, one must always also retain a sort of skepticism that such outside viewpoints may easily be overcome by the contravening testimony of actual members.
Where I get nervous is whenever an outsider to a group says, "they believe x, y, and z" or "x,y, and z is in their interest" and, when a member of the group disagrees, the outsider asserts superiority or discursive authority over the insider. I find very serious, probably fatal, epistemological and normative problems with such techniques. And, based on my personal observations that are admittedly anecdotal, I find those techniques relatively commonplace.

2) Problems of epistemic realism are only half of my critique of the Marxist viewpoint. I can grant that other systems of aggregation and classification may be equally problematic without undermining my claim that "class" is problematic. Indeed, I think constructivist approaches routinely grant the problematic nature of almost all constructed systems of classification.

3) The other half of my critique about Marxism is normative, however. I think Marxist focus upon class may be normatively problematic in three ways:

a) The attribution and even prescription of views and interests onto a "lower" class may function to discursive strip some individuals of an authentic voice in favor of the less authentic voice of the academic.

b) Discursive empowerment of an elite (and often elistist) "vanguard" that speaks for and prescribes for the "class" serves to create a new structure of oppression that controls the "class" just as much as they were supposedly controlled under other masters. Whether you call them "capitalists" or "managers" or even "union bosses" they still exercise systems of power and oppression based on a constructed claim of privelege.

b) Notions of class tend to reify socio-economic boundaries, raise discursive barriers, inflame prejudices and stereotypes, and stifle the socio-economic mobility of individuals by labelling them permanent members of a "class". This tends to impose a inauthentic constructed identity and exercise what Gaventa called the "third face of power" while masking it behind egalitarian rhetoric.