"Is" = "Resolution of Fact" analysis

[pattybar]

When and how, if ever, does a resolution dictate a kind of case (fact, value or policy)?

I've heard that the term 'is' requires a resolution of fact kind of analysis, but this seems a bit strange.

How about this resolution, "America's golden age of culture still lies ahead".... does that require the gov to prove something about the future?? I had a team lose a case on T when they proposed to start a children's music program... gov said that there is no 'should' in the resolution that would imply the need for an action. Seems to be a pretty steep burden for the gov.

Patty

[joecool12321]

It really depends on the resolution. Let's just keep using APU examples. One round the resolution read, "The current divorce rate is unbearable." The government teams from our school were prepared to defend the round as a fact or value: unbearable is a quality that the current divorce rate either does or does not posses. As the opposition, though, we wanted to force the government to provide a policy (what solves for the divorce rate?!). So we prepared an argument trying to say that if something is unbearable, something must be done, or else it is bearable, it just sucks. We ended up not having to use that argument, because the other team abolished marriage as an institution and we picked up on T.

All that to say, something could perhaps have the word "is" in it, and yet still necessitate an action. Maybe.

--Joey

P.S. As I think is clear by now, I'm a big fan of letting all debate, including meta-...-debate, happen in-round.

[stannard67]

I believe that running a policy on an "is" case risks fiating the truth of the resolution, or alternatively ASSUMING the truth of the resolution in order to justify the plan. I'm not saying that's good or bad, but it seems to be the logical construction here.

stannard

[properwinston]

This fact/value/policy typology is unbearably anachronistic. I know that it is good for teaching novices, but from my experience, it just adds more confusion. I think the only valuable typology is fiat and non-fiat. I've found that open debaters generally agree that fiat cases are superior because they keep the variables constant and don't devolve into example wars.

Interpreting "is" as a fact is very short-sighted. Heidegger's notion that the what we talk about is as important as our final conclusion supports the concept of interpreting an "is" resolution as a policy case. Let's examine the resolution "The trees are dying." Ostensibly this is a fact case. But why does the resolution decide to describe this fact as opposed to infinite amount of alternative phenomenons in the world. Clearly, this resolution is normative.

[pattybar]

One of my debaters (I was about to say 'novice' debaters.. but we are in our first semester, they are ALL novices...) responded to an "is" = 'res o-fact' T in a practice round brilliantly --- he said, duh, there is a problem here, now if you saw someone bleeding on the sidewalk would you say, well... the resolution said 'bleeding is painful' you seem to be feeling pain, so the resolution is true... and walk away... NO, you'd do something about it.... and plan does someting about the situation....

I actually don't think the fact/value/policy divisions are that anachronistic... I do think that there are few, if any actual value cases run these days and that policy always has some sort of value behind it... but, I think that at least value and policy kinds of case ideas are different, at least in emphasis and case burdens.... and that fact cases stink (just my own opinion.... never saw one that worked..).

Patty

[pattybar]

Re Stannard's observation... sure, whe 'is' plays a major rold in the resolutionyou need to assume the truth of the resolution in some way... It seems that res-o-fact requires the gov team to assert the truth of the resolution without even an attempt to demonstrate that truth.

When it comes to either policy or value sorts of cases, the analysis is rather simple.... either plan's results are to create a situtation in which the resolution is true or since resolution is true, we should do..... Either way, the gov is choosing to make the debate about the plan, not the resolution.

Patty

[pattybar]

Re Stannard's observation... sure, when 'is' plays a major role in the resolutionyou need to assume the truth of the resolution in some way... It seems that res-o-fact requires the gov team to assert the truth of the resolution without even an attempt to demonstrate that truth.

When it comes to either policy or value sorts of cases, the analysis is rather simple.... either plan's results are to create a situtation in which the resolution is true or since resolution is true, we should do..... Either way, the gov is choosing to make the debate about the plan, not the resolution.

Patty

[Samopolis]

Thanks for bringing this up, Patty. It's something I've been thinking about for a while now.

I don't think any particular word in the resolution intrinsically dictates which type of case is appropriate for the topic. However, what certain words ("is" among them) do lay down is the burden of proof.

The word "is" becomes especially critical when establishing Gov's burden on a fact/value resolution. It's important to point out that "is" is a conjugation of the verb "to be." This, IMHO, clearly precludes a policy interpretation, as it is impossible to prove true something which has not yet happened. (because we all know fiat is an illusory construct, right? ;) )

It frustrates me a great deal when Gov defaults to a policy interpretation of a resolution that clearly outlines their burden as fact/value. In such a scenario I always try and make it clear to the audience/critic in the LOC that the Government is not upholding their resolutional responsibilities and that, while nice and dandy, a policy is just not adequate to prove the motion true.

Just another problem that occurs when teams become a slave to their casebook...

[pattybar]

Sam,

You are confusing me... you say that no words in the resolution require a particular kind of case, but then you tell me that the resolution (as a whole???) gives burdens of the fact/value/policy sort.

How can this be? It seems to me that the resolution gives a general guideline for debate, but that all three of the traditional kinds of cases could fit into those guidelines.

For example, even a resolution that specifically uses the term 'value' could easily lead to a policy-type case.

Example: THW value brains over braun could link to a policy case in which a school gives no athletic scholarships, only academic ones.... or one that promotes raising the minimum ACT score for NCAA participation, or one that closes the loophole of JC transfers (where athletes go to a junior college, get some easy grades and then transfer to a big sports school wihout having to get the minimum ACT score )....

The link is really simple. Gov's burden is to value brains, we do it via this case. Defeat of case = choice of braun over brains.... very simple.

Don't assume that just because teams prefer policy cases, it is because those cases are "canned" (whatever that means...). I think this is because a) policy cases are generally prefered by the judge pool, and b) teams simply don't know how to run value cases. I suspect that a) gives us b).

As for the idea of a value/fact case... aargh.... what would that look like? I would both love it and hate it simultaneously and my head would then explode.....

Patty

[truthisjust]

"A policy IS needed to deal with the AIDS epidemic in Africa."

Sam,

Does this resolution preclude a policy? If I run a policy can't I justify and policy interp. of this resolution by arguing that my plan is a definition or clarification of the resolution? It seems what you are saying is that specific words don't force you to do something but instead they prevent you from doing certain things. I would never teach a student to look for certain words when deciding if something was fact/value or policy because there are exceptions to every rule (or in this case theory).

[Eagle of Meaux]

I think there is one key assumption that seems to be inherent in the idea that “is,” or some statement of being, must necessitate a “fact” resolution. The assumption deals with what question the debate ought answer. It seems the community consensus is that the debate on such a proposition (i.e. “the US is the sole superpower” Bad res, but ignore that for a moment) ought revolve around the question of whether or not this resolution is true. I suggest a different question could be asked: ought this resolution be true. To my knowledge there is nothing which mandates the former question be addressed beyond community bias. I also believe, for a number of reasons, that the latter question may be more education and make for clearer debate in many occasions. Y’all’s thoughts?

Keith

(oh and patty, I think there's one more reason that values are run more often: judges have radically different ideas of how to judge them which makes it an absolute crap shoot from competitors who don't know a lot about their judges.)

[pattybar]

Keith,

I think you are correct about how value cases are judged... so, part of the challenge is to make a clear dichotomy in the PMC, so the judge can see the burdens established and the clear division of ground. After that, it is about as much a crap shoot as other cases.

I think the keys to value kinds of cases are to 1) establish a clear dicotomy in the round, 2) clearly articulate your value, using examples as needed and 3) provide a non-tautological weighing mechanism to decide the round.

Anyway, interesting question on the "ought (insert supposedly fact resolution here) that be true -- leaves the gov's "yes" answer with a few interesting options... you could run a policy that would result in the res being true, or you could argue for the desierablilty of the res being true... hmmm....

Patty

Patty

[Samopolis]

Justin wrote:
<strong>I would never teach a student to look for certain words when deciding if something was fact/value or policy because there are exceptions to every rule (or in this case theory).</strong>
Cool, I'm glad we agree. (see the very first statement of my post: "I don't think any particular word in the resolution intrinsically dictates which type of case is appropriate for the topic.")

In the example presented ("A policy is needed to deal with the AIDS epidemic in Africa") the word "is" establishes your burden as proving the <strong>necessity</strong> of a policy to address the AIDS epidemic in Africa. I don't care how you do it, but fiat alone ain't enough b/c it would have to assume the resolution already true.

[pattybar]

Couldn't you say that you are proving the resolution true on moral grounds and run a values sort of case on that resolution?

Patty

[Samopolis]

Sorry if I'm confusing you, Patty.

<strong>you say that no words in the resolution require a particular kind of case, but then you tell me that the resolution (as a whole???) gives burdens of the fact/value/policy sort.</strong>

Are we reading the same post? When did I say the resolution as a whole gives burdens? I think I made it very clear that the word "is" carries a certain burden that a policy interpretation just can't uphold (see my response to Justin).

<strong>It seems to me that the resolution gives a general guideline for debate, but that all three of the traditional kinds of cases could fit into those guidelines.</strong>

I couldn't disagree more strongly. Resolutions are (or should) be crafted to divide ground very clearly and (ideally) very fairly. At the point where it simply becomes a "general guideline" (whatever that means) you've opened the door to a Pandora's Box of topicality, ground skews, and nebulous burdens. No, no, no.

<strong>For example, even a resolution that specifically uses the term 'value' could easily lead to a policy-type case....The link is really simple. Gov's burden is to value brains, we do it via this case. Defeat of case = choice of braun over brains.... very simple.</strong>

That's cool, Patty, but it doesn't correspond to any of my analysis. My post was only concerned with the word "is" and how it lays down ground. Indeed, the first thing I wrote in my first post was that I <em>don't</em> think any particular word AUTOMATICALLY dictates a particular type of case.

<strong>I think this is because a) policy cases are generally prefered by the judge pool, and b) teams simply don't know how to run value cases. I suspect that a) gives us b).</strong>

I think that many teams default to a policy interpretation because such cases divide ground much more easily (fiat is a great clarifying mechanism). My problem is when they try to shoehorn them into resolutions that just don't fit. Often times I feel like I'm debating the same resolution every round: "THW put a square peg in a round hole."

<strong>As for the idea of a value/fact case... aargh.... what would that look like?</strong>
The "/" in there is in place of the word "or" (I'm not advocating a hybrid, don't worry). It just seems appropriate to lump them together when dealing with the word "is" b/c both value and fact cases require the same burden (albeit one subjective, one objective).

~Sam

[Samopolis]

braun = brawn

prefered = preferred

aargh = aaaaaaaaaaaaaargh!

:)

[Samopolis]

<blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Couldn't you say that you are proving the resolution true on moral grounds and run a values sort of case on that resolution?[/quote]
Come again?

[pattybar]

Sam,

You still don't answer the basic points of my post...

Why is "is" a special word?

What kind of division of ground does it give that another word does not? You assert that there is some sort of ground division that a policy case can't uphold, but you don't tell me what that division is or why it is so.

How can any word dictate a fact, value or policy kind of case?

So, say the resolution says, "It is better to be smart than pretty"

How does the government go about proving that in some sort of fact framework? You have no printed evidence to use in parli, so any case that tries to uphold this as "fact" becomes an example war.... thus it is impossible to uphold.

You could create some sort of value dichotomy that values the intellect over the body, but those are also often messy, poorly defined and constructed and VERY often judged on the judge's bias... thus difficult to prove.

Now, if you said that you are going to run a policy case that requires, for the policy to be in place, the valuaing of smartness over beauty, then you can actually have a debate.

In this way, the resolution can only be a general guideline. The nightmare scenario you pose above does not apply... as what I said was that the resolution is a general guideline in that you could choose any of the three different KINDS OF CASES to support the resolution. Beyond that, the guideline would allow an opp team to argue that the gov case fails to fall under the guideline, thus becoming unfair in some basic way.

Patty

[truthisjust]

Sam,

I don't think we agree as much as you think we do. I am arguing that is does not establish any burdens. More than that I don't think it precludes you from establishing certain types of burdens of your own as you seem to think.

[Samopolis]

Patty,

I've got a ton of homework tonight, so I won't be able to post my reply until tommorow or Friday. This is shaping into an interesting debate, though.
<img src=http://www.net-benefits.net/emoticons/argue.gif ALT=":argue">

~Sammy :p

[Thegame1012]

I believe that if the resolution has is in it more than likely it is a fact because you are stating that something is the way it is for a fact! For example "It is wrong to judge" However to me if the red said "It is better to love than to hate" to me that is a value" I will tell you though I feel there needs to be a set standard as to what a res is and that it should be ran as such. For example we received a topic " Jingoism is more dangerous than religious fanatisism" I though it was a value because you are comparing two different ideas, but they ran it as a policy. We argued non topical and showed they had no plan workability, and they still won! How is that possible :( I just feel that in Parli we need a set standard that is adhered to in a round regarding the way cases are sturctured as well as their determination of a win or loss.

[properwinston]

If you want to move towards a better case-construction get rid of the fact/value/policy typology. There are only two types of case, fiat and non-fiat cases. To put it bluntly, non-fiat cases are pathetic. These cases are more likely to skew the ground, have no workable criteria, and contain no true case impacts. I'm not claiming that fiat case construction is perfect, but like democracy, it is the best system we currently have. With fiat cases, a fair criteria can exist (net-benefits/cost-benefits), ground is clearer, and actual case impacts exist. Within fiat cases values and facts exist. Fiat cases allow values to come into conflict and use facts for supporting or discrediting stock issues.

[Eagle of Meaux]

Grant, I agree with you that the existence of fiat is a key distinction. I also agree that fiat or plan based debates are typically better. However I would say that there is a better division. I think all reses can be accurately divided into descriptive resolutions and normative resolutions. From there you can debate whether or not fiat exists. I would argue that fiat ought be available to the government team anytime they wish to propose a plan. I would further argue that while plans need not be constrained to normative resolutions they tend to work better there. Out of curiosity, how do you determine if a resolution is fiat or not fait res?

“TheGame” (sorry I didn’t catch your name) I think resolution distinctions are quite flexible and that the normative claims buried underneath any descriptive statement make it possible to shift almost any round into a normative or plan based paradigm legitimately. Obviously there are some cases which still don’t fall under the resolution after this shift, but I still think the shift is nearly always legitimate. Regarding workability: I’d be curious to know more about the situation and what the arguments were, but most workability claims I’m familiar with just act to mitigate solvency. They rarely serve any kind of offensive function by themselves. This would indicate to me that if all that was argued was workability (on the pragmatic level at least) then the ballot would tend to go government. Just because a plan will most likely fail isn’t a reason not to give it a try unless there’s some disadvantage, at least in my opinion. (more than a few judges have disagreed with me on this one :) )

I also think the setting standards might acutely be a bad thing, I like the idea that rules ought all be debated within rounds. The problem, in my opinion, is that many judges don’t rely purely on what occurs in the round, but bring in preconceptions about how debate should work. I like the ideat hat this is an activity determined by the debaters and I believe that we are the ones who ought take the initiative to shape community perceptions. I think the best way that can happen is when judges cast their ballots based purely on the round and not on preconceptions. I fear that codification of some kind of rule as to how certain cases must be run will decrease the ability of the competitors to argue that within the round and hurt not only the education of those involved, but the fairness of the activity as a whole.

…ok, I’ll get off my soap box now.

Keith

[properwinston]

Keith,

My fundamental disagreement with your description vs. normative typology comes from my belief that everything is normative. I simply don't believe that pure objectivity exists. The mere choice of a topic is a normative assertion. For instance, in our round at Cal, my decision to talk about Palestine was a normative assertion in of itself. By focusing on this area of the world I am declaring that it is more important than other areas. By always talking about Bush, Iraq, Palestine, Affirmitive Action, Sexual Harrasment etc. and not talking about Papau New Guinea, the debate world (or at least the autocratic tournament directors) is privileging these subject matters over others. Of course, this is why fighting topicality is so important, but that is a whole nother conversation that I don't want to get into right now. When we indocrinate our novices with Aristotle's fact/value/policy typology or your better version of this (the descriptive/normative), we are only doing ourselves a disservice. I honestly believe that fiat cases are the only cases that should ever be run in a parliamentary debate. All of the novices on my team do this and they have found parli debate more cogent and enjoyable. The very fact that non-fiat (or as you would call them, descriptive) are rarely run in open rounds is telling.

I wholeheartedly agree with your second argument that the rules of parli should be constructed within the round. Judges love to perpetuate their own banal conceptions of debate and they do so by entering the round without the famed "blank slate." There is clearly an inverse relationship between the amount of "rules" someone believes to exist in debate and their knowledge of debate. Knowing this, I've been able to extinguish my anger towards some of the dreadful aspects of parli's judging pool. I can't really state how I feel about certain judges and/or judging communities because they have power over me and my team by their ability to fill in the ballot. So before I get myself into more trouble, I'll leave my comments at this.

[Samopolis]

Grant, you have yet to make a case for the inferiority of "non-fiat" cases, as you call them. Other than the fact that fiat can at times be a strong clarifying mechanism, you've simply thrown out a bunch of unsubstantiated generalizations, presumably based on your idiosyncratic (and apparently negative) experience with "non-fiat" cases.

I love this notion that CBA (whatever that means) is somehow "fair" whereas these unnamed fact/value criteria are so nebulous, given to ground skew, etc.

And your claims that fiat cases are more common, that your novices like them better, etc. are cute but not real arguments.

I could not disagree more strongly with your obnoxious marginalization of fact/value debate.

~Sam

[Samopolis]

And don't worry, Patty, my proof that fiat is semantically irreconcilable to the word "is" will hopefully be forthcoming this weekend.
:D

[properwinston]

Oh how smug your responses were. It would have been nice for you to address at least one of my main arguments, besides of course saying that my personal experience with the novices on my team is so unimportant. Might I ask for you to posit why non-fiat cases are so great? Might you please respond to my argument that everything is normative? Can you tell me why it is a rarity for anyone to run non-fiat cases in open debate. Also, can you tell an ignoramus such as myself why the word "fiat" is so pernicious. I look forward to your post about why the word "is" is irreconcilable with fiat cases. Let's just hope you don't take us back to 1885 with this piece of philosophical brilliance.

love,

Properwinston

[properwinston]

p.s., name me a criteria better than CBA.

[Samopolis]

Call my responses what you will, but mind that you're the one nonchalantly dismissing whole debate paradigms like fact/value cases and topicality. Plus, I think you made some pretty provocative statements in your first two posts. People are going to react strongly when you say things like that.

This has gotten touchy, so let's go line-by-line.

<em>besides of course saying that my personal experience with the novices on my team is so unimportant.</em>
Nope, it's not unimportant (your experience with your novices is great), it's just not a warrant for the elimination of fact/value cases.

<em>Might I ask for you to posit why non-fiat cases are so great?</em>
I don't think I'm the one with the burden here, but I'll write another post on that subject (I happen to like them).

<em>Might you please respond to my argument that everything is normative?</em>
To be honest, I respect your metaphysical viewpoint but don't see how it clashes with the inherent worth of value cases.

<em>Can you tell me why it is a rarity for anyone to run non-fiat cases in open debate.</em>
Several reasons. First, I'd wager it's that most debaters don't feel comfortable arguing value in a competitive environment due to their complicated nature (this snowballs, of course). I'll also point out (to your credit) that it's generally much easier to come up with a strong policy case in fifteen minutes than a strong value case and that fiat debates are generally clearer coming out of the PMC than value cases.

And although I wasn't around to see it, I'd also bet that the rise of prepared arguments helped fiat cases a great deal. Also many high school policy debaters are opting for NPDA.

<em>Also, can you tell an ignoramus such as myself why the word "fiat" is so pernicious.</em>
I honestly don't sense a stigma around it.

<em>I look forward to your post about why the word "is" is irreconcilable with fiat cases. Let's just hope you don't take us back to 1885 with this piece of philosophical brilliance.</em>
Ouch. Sorry if I'm not trendy.

This was more a joke referring to my promise to post it last weekend. It's an explanation of my assertion that the semantics of the word "is" on certain resolutions establishes a burden for Gov that CBA doesn't cover. I hope you'll like it.

<em>name me a criteria better than CBA.</em>
I can't, and that's the point. Think about what it means: cost-benefit analysis. Pick more good than bad. This is a very common concept and it's not unique to fiat cases at all. All values and judgements are weighed under this simple principle. CBA or "net-benefits" are just silly names we come up for them.

And would make it any more clear or fair than, say, prep. of evidence?

Cheers,
~Sam

[properwinston]

Samopolis,

Unlike many writers on the net-benefit site, I have to credit you for handling a heated debate in a cogent manner. The main point of my whole normative analysis bit is that a normative statement implies an action. A trite but efficacious example is when I see a man bleeding on the road and I yell out "oh my God, there is a man on the road bleeding to death." According to the standard fact/value/policy typology, I could only run a fact case about the poor man dying on the road. I could contend that there is a liquidy, red substance coming out of his head, his pulse is gone, etc. Eventually we could evaluate these statements and more likely than not conclude that the man is in fact dying on the road. However, I think that the original statement clearly implies some sort of action. If it didn't imply such an action, then the statement itself would be meaningless (that is unless you lived in a society that valued death). Back to the world of debate, if a resolution states that freedom is superior to security, don't you think a normative assertion is intrinsic to such a statement. Just as with the dying man on the road, I think it would be more appropriate to put the values to use through a policy as opposed to debating the merits of these values in the abstract, especially when they aren' t in conflict with eachother. The same thing applies to a fact case. If a resolution states that "Iraq is the Axis of the axis of evil" don't you think that some sort of action is implied or should we just sit back and forever debate in 7-8-8-8-4-5 time frames until we get to the truth of the matter (which ironically can never be done in such a short amount of time). Fiat cases are superior because they allow for values and facts to come into play, but only if they are pertinent to the actual fiat.

best,

Properwinston.

[USC MissingLink]

<blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>p.s., name me a criteria better than CBA.[/quote]Net Benefits, duh! ;)

jEd

[rmccutch2]

The first problem with parliamentary debate is that there is no initial standard other than the judge’s own interpretation on what proving means. Courtrooms need (and have) definitions for proof (which are artificial btw), so do parliamentary debate rounds. Fact/value/policy cases are artificial constructs, but important on creating criteria for what proving means. The definitions that I have been taught and that which makes most sense to me are: For a fact, proof is whether or not something is more often true than untrue. For a value proof is that weighed against some value something is good or bad. For a policy proof is that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages for some action. This would end the problems if resolutions stated which were facts, values, or policies – but they don’t.

Which leads to the second problem: everyone (debaters and critics alike) already has preconceived ideas about how cases should be run. Some adhere to a strict division of fact/value/policy. Others feel that policies should be run on any resolution. This causes confusion and frustration; yet is unnecessary. The primary burden of the government is to uphold the resolution. A policy can be used to uphold a “value” resolution if that policy upholds the resolution. This, however, places more burdens on the government than necessary. For example, the resolution “Capital punishment is inherently unjust” does not call for the government team to make capital punishment more just or to abolish capital punishment. No team should be forced to remove any of the “unjustness.” Yet a team could reasonably run a policy to abolish capital punishment, however they must still prove “inherently unjust” (most likely place is the harms). Teams that fail to prove “inherently unjust” should lose, even if they have a policy that has solvency and advantages that outweigh the opposition’s disadvantages.

For these reasons I feel that the best case to use is whichever method(s) are necessary to uphold the resolution. The government should not have the default in defining which type of case should be run. The opposition should be allowed to run a case that shows whether a fact, value, policy, or some other type of case could better oppose the resolution. The only way for the critic, though, to define best uphold or oppose is to have an arbitrary standard for what resolutions are. IMHO resolutions should state “Fact: drug testing violates privacy” or “Value: This House Believes jingoism is as dangerous as religious fanaticism” or “Policy: This House Should repeal the drug laws.” But they do not… so the only way to judge is on the words in the resolution: If the resolution is a statement (is either true or false) it should be supported by a fact case. If the resolution passes judgment on something (x is good or x is bad) it should be supported by a value case. If the resolution explicitly calls for a specific action, it should be a policy case. If the resolution has a combination or none of the above then and only then should the government determine the best type of case.

Ideally no artificial constraints should be placed on debate… but for as fair and accurate a decision as can be made in the round, artificial limits are required and those limits need to be objective not subjective.

[pattybar]

Interesting thoughts on the interpretation of resolutions...

The problem is that, a) what about a resolution requires gov to run a specific kind of case? and b) aren't fact cases nearly impossible to do well?

Folks, I've seen many debates and am in my 6th year coaching and judging NPDA... I have yet to see a gov team run a res of fact case that was persuasive and debatable. This is due to the nature of parli, and without evidence the decision in a 'fact' case comes down to which side has the examples that happen to play to the judge's bias.

Even if there are such things as 'fact' resolutions... it still seems to me that the most persuasive way to uphold the resolution is to run a policy with some kind of value as its motivator, or to run a value with some kinds of policy examples to further explain the value itself. As long as the T story is well constructed, why not?

Without that kind of thinking, gov teams end up running straight resolutions such as "Resolved: America's cultural peak is in the future" and trying to assert that it must be in the future because it hasn't happened yet...

Patty

[PancreasMatt]

heh he, sam, just had a funny thought. from now on i'm defining "is" through Heideggers idea of Dasein, or being. essentially the question "what is "is"" can only be answered through Ontology- i.e., how we "be" in the world. soooooooo... that means, the only way to answer the question of being posed by "what "is" is" is to define the truth of the res through action, thus a policy is required. Come up with a cooler way to define "is" than that, sam. i dare you. bwahaha. I'll never have to do a stupid fact again!!!!
matt c.

[Gavin499]

Congratulations Matt, and thank you sincerely. I think it's very nice that you bring up Heidigger and his perspectives on this particular debate, unfortunately I think you fundamentally miscontrue what his position is. You say that the question of "is" is defined by how we "be". Exactly, the critical thing missing here that a policy would enact determines what "ought to be," which is exactly the problem. No resolution dealing with problems in the status quo can be evaluated by enacting a policy if we view it through the ontology of being.

On a second note, I tend to lean toward the idea that fact/value cases can be legitimate for a couple critical reasons. The first is the idea of a burden. I've heard repeatedly the example of a bleeding person on the ground, the problem with this is that it assumes that a debate round is the correct form to go through the entire process of determining the harms, establishing a policy and coming up with solvency. I would argue that a policy does not "save the man" any more than your plan does. Think about it, I say let's stop the bleeding man by using pressure on the wound. You say, NO! Let's try to transport him to a hospital. My response is, perm, do both, let's put pressure on him and THEN bring him to the hospital! Meanwhile Joe on the ground is bleeding to death.

The problem I see is with the brightline, why is 45 minutes enough time to waste before actually saving the mans life, but 90 minutes is too much? I use 90 minutes for a reason, if the first 45 minutes is used to establish if he is dying (which is much more of a debate when it's less obvious than a bleeding man on the street) and then the NEXT 45 we can have a resolution like, THB we would STOP the man from bleeding. See how the two can work together? Why is 45 minutes not too long, but 90 is? Since there is no brightline I would contend that the only way to evaluate if it should use a plan or not would be the resolution. If it asks for an action then I guess you're going to have to give one. That's the brightline, and as Matt tells us, the word "is" dealing with the concept of "being" not what ought to be.

Finally, just to spur comments, I think it would almost be possible that if our goal was truly to come to the best way of solving the problems (say social security), the BETTER way would be to deal with fact and value cases and perhaps finally a policy. Think about it, we can debate first the value of Social Security (is it good or bad) for 45 minutes, which is certainly a debate that can be had. Then we can debate the facts of the problems of social security (what is causing the bankruptcy, how soon will it be gone, how many people will be affected, who will be affected) again certainly a viable debate. Finally we can look at a policy, spend 45 minutes on that too! In the interest of good policy making, let's not claim to have to deal with ALL that in ONE 45 minute period, rather let's do what the resolution often calls upon us to do, which is evaluate one of these discussions. The fact that facts and values exist in a policy does not necessarily mean that good debate comes from cramming them all into one time restrained debate...

As a result I think the only conclusion that can be made is that people don't run policy just for good debate, or to save the bleeding man (remember, fiat is illusionary, nobody is actually saved). They run policies because they are able to beg the question, avoid the debate they don't want to have, and "parametricize" the opposition ground right out of the room... Ah well, I intended to give my 2 cents, and I think ended up giving a few bucks... Until we meet again!

Gavin

[Eagle of Meaux]

Matt I think I'm just going to have to steal that cute little justification for myself. Huzzah for Hidegger. :) :) :)

Keith

[Eagle of Meaux]

I guess I'm going have to look into the Heidegger thing more before using it.

I think you raise an interesting point Gavin, I would suggest that it is actually an argument for doing only policy not an argument for doing other types of resolutions. Policy debates (or normative fiat based debates if you prefer) Have the first half of the debate you suggest (is the man bleeding) in the harms section of the debate. They then have the second half (how should be treat the man) in the solvency section.
Because policy style debates can be an effective synthesis of these worlds I'd argue that if you value both of them you ought prefer policy.

Keith

[Samopolis]

Yes, but if your harms scenario proves the res true why would you take on the added burden of providing a net-beneficial policy? Makes little sense to me.

I think Matt has the best analysis of us all. However, I think he should go to Heidegger Anonymous to get help with his addiction. :) Even my Bork fetish can't top his love for that man.

I wonder if fiat tastes like chicken....

[PancreasMatt]

heh heh, gavins right probably, but i just thought it would be sort of funny, since typically the people who would say "you have to be fact, i dont want you to give us neg people more ground" wouldn't have a great response to ontology. thanks for the clear up gavin!
matt c.
p.s. sam, who is bork? :-)

[Samopolis]

You'll find out next time we hit in a break round.... <img src=http://www.net-benefits.net/emoticons/firedevil.gif ALT=":devil">

[Gavin499]

Here's the thing, I think some of you are correct that you CAN attempt to place the fact/value debate in harms and move on to policy, but there are a couple of issues:

1) Strategically it wouldn't seem to be a good strategy to add a policy on top of harms, but of course it is, specifically because it doesn't allow the debate about the value of the resolution itself. Policy is run because it gives gov a good advantage (they've got cases prepped out they can fit into lots of resolutions)

2) THE RESOLUTION! I have yet to hear a compelling (or I think any) argument that the resolution is the brightline for when something is or is not calling for action. Is there a better brightline? I would contend that the resolution has as its sole purpose to define ground, so for you to change that (even with the contention that it gives them MORE ground) is to not prove the resolution true. At the very least you would not be giving sufficient time to the decision that the resolution calls upon us to evaluate (we ought to spend all 45 minutes on what the RESOLUTION wants us to discuss, not 10 minutes on that and 35 on a different, though perhaps linked, topic.)

Gavin

[sbatt]

A couple random thoughts, and my own explanation of the infamous mishandled typology.
a. Many of the so called fact topics folks use seem a whole lot more like value topics to me according to the traditional way of dividing them from one another.
b. The Zig. and Kay textbook treats the case forms for fact and value the same. Both types of propositions require definitions, an evaluative standard for making the decision, and applications of the standard to the objects in the case. Facts topics are mainly distinguished by the empirical nature of the standard. Example: There is extraterrestrial life on Mars. That's a fact topic, and it clearly has limitations if one wants to enjoy the debate. Example: Modern art is more to be condemned than approved. (a value topic).
c. It's pretty ridiculous that so many are mishandling a basic distinction in the first place, and then complaining about the model in the second place. When Parli debaters start labeling value topics fact topics, of course there will be trouble. The trouble is NOT with the model though.
d. Value propositions or definitional arguments (a special case of value props) have a lower burden of proof than policy propositions. Moreover, they represent a large area of potential inquiry becoming increasingly under explored by debate because of a lack of preparation. When everyone just stops with the complaint that non-policy debates devolve into "example wars" it is clear the community is in a stagnant phase in the history of its thinking. The idea that all policy topics have elements of value takes the "example wars" complaint out. Policy cases are built up out of several subarguments that are essentially value props, but oh, those value props are always about example wars. The whole thing is a stack of cards now, right? Well, no; just that noone is bothering to think about how example wars ought to proceed (many argument textbooks can provide starting points if anyone wants to break out of their novice habits.)
d. The typology in my experience has never operated at any other level than as a system for discovering arguments on a topic. If you see an action called for in the topic, you can infer that there should be a need, a plan, and the plan should be practical. The models are grounded in a theory of human psychology, but they still only operate as topoi, not empirical categories. Basically, in my view, an issue is anything you must establish in order to motivate a decision maker to change her mind or make a commitment to one view over another. If you can classify a topic in a way that helps you narrow down your model of what issues must be covered, it seems useful to me.
e. If you don't buy this yet, how about the economic argument? In a market where the goods are all the same, do you want to be offering the same old goods? Right now, the market of ideas in debate is stagnant, and there is tremendous apathy, and its caused by weak policy argument combined with an excessive commitment to policy cases. If you see a value topic, and it doesn't require you to take on the huge burden of proof of a policy case, please please consider running another kind of case idea, especially if you know the other team is quite proficient at going opp. on policy, and even more especially if you are just going to lose on T even before they start testing the policy case. There is a large potential for windfall profits for anyone willing to learn how to do something besides run superficial policy cases.

What the heck is this typology of non fiat and fiat? Can someone provide a cite for this? Doesn't this collapse all controversy into only policy props?

Shawn Batt, UOP

[joecool12321]

"Value propositions or definitional arguments have a lower burden of proof than policy propositions."

Why does the burden change based on the type of debate?

[Samopolis]

<img src=http://www.net-benefits.net/emoticons/hearhear.gif ALT=":hear"> (see post above Joey's)

Okay, Shawn has basically written the post I was going to have to draft this weekend.

Glad I'm not the only one who realizes that:

1. Policy cases are the most complicated and have a far greater tendency towards chaos than value debate (sorry, Grant, but simply asking for the round to be weighed under "net benefits" or "CBA" doesn't do or clarify anything).

2. Each harm/advantage/disadvantage argument in a policy setting is itself a self-contained value claim (kritiks only scratch the surface, especially considering the manner in which most are run).

3. Many (I won't stick my neck out far enough to claim <em>most</em>) policy cases are run/argued in a superficial fashion (more on what this means later). What I find especially alarming is the ease with which many policy cases use moral superiority as some kind of crude weapon.

4. Most debaters are largely ignorant of how to properly construct a value proposition and often default to a policy interpretation out of convenience.

5. a) There are all kinds of teams out there that kick butt on policy but couldn't argue a value to save their lives; and
b) they are very vulnerable on the neg as a result.

Thanks for your insight, Shawn. Score one for the good guys. ;)

~Sam

[sbatt]

Sam,
Thanks for the words of praise, and for demonstrating how much more clear some of these issues could be.
Shawn

[properwinston]

Without sounding dogmatic, I don't believe that a better criteria exists than CBA. The reason for this is that CBA is the only true criteria in our society. Quality and quantity of life are the end points of any debate. The only reason we support certain values is because they increase either the quality or quanitity of life. Of course, other cultures don't seek to maximize the quality or quantity of life, but these cultures are inferior so it doesn't matter what they value (I can predict the insults, so don't bother with them).

In a value debate, the criteria will always lead towards quality or quantity of life measurements. I would love for someone to refute this point, but it isn't going to happen.

[Dan6814]

But I think the point people are making is that a criteria of CBA doesn't clarify anything. If you run a gov case with CBA as your criterion, and you show that you save more lives, how do we weigh that against an opp team that defends liberty? I'm not sure how to weigh that within a cost-benefit analysis (or, for that matter, a net benefits) scale, and I don't think most people could do that without a significant debate within the round. The criterion of CBA doesn't clarify the major values within a round so much as it removes the existence of any meaningful criterion.

Dan

[properwinston]

The reason why some of you don't trust CBA or find it rather vague is because parli uses a simplistic version of the utilitarianism. Bentham's pure utilitiarianism is the most common form of CBA analysis in debate. In this version of CBA, the calculus usually comes down to who best upholds quantity of life. Sometimes parli takes into account quality of life, but this calculus is vague. I am not an expert on utilitarianism, but I know that JS Mill spent most of his lifetime developing a better form of CBA. We should agree CBA is the root of all good decisions, but the concept of CBA needs to be further developed.

[pattybar]

The main problem with most "CBA" crits is that they assume a consequentialist view of ethics. Why is this standpoint necessarily the best? Assuming any basic utilitarianism as the standpoint is not a saffe assumption, at least not within ethics...

I won't agree that CBA is the best crit. We make decisions for reasons other than basic utility regularly. We use questions of motive in court and in reality when making decisions about what is or is not acceptable behavior. If someone in a soccer game intends to foul another player, the ref judges intention by where their eyes point and issues penalties accordinly. If a child accidentally spills the milk, their mother treats the incident differently than if they intentionally turned over the glass...etc.

Patty

[properwinston]

Including the concept of consequentialism does little to damage the efficacy of CBA. Would you advocate a policy with substantive DAs as long as the prop team had good intentions? Of course not. Your examples involve assigning blame, but judging a policy involves its results, in the form of DAs versus ADs. In the end, the only reason anyone advocates a value is because they believe it will either improve the quality or quantity of life, which of course is the root calculus of CBA.

[pattybar]

The real problem with util is that you cannot control the actual outcomes, but you can control your actions and the motivations for them... so if ethics is about the best actions, deontology gives the best guide for action.

Additionally, in debate land, the gov team asserts (debaters often call them arguments, but they aren't) outcomes and the opp team asserts DAs.. but what is really going on is that the team with the best reasoned motives for or against a particular action wins... as we cannot actually DO the policy and then judge its effects to decide whether or not the act was a good one... so you may think you are using CBA, but it has a Kantian basis...

Patty

[Branarchist]

Hey All:

Interesting that anyone would choose to assert a best criteria for all cases as advanced by the monolith of our superior culture. Good Goddess, properwinston, I hope you're a wizard at answering K. Either that, or it's a masterful application of ironic rhetoric... ;-)

My personal objection to CBA stems from E.F. Schumacher's 1975 book _Small_Is_Beautiful_. Cost benefits analysis was formulated and is applied as a purely economic calculus based on equivilent values (or whatever Marxists call 'em... paging Stannard!) versus use values. Cost Benefit Analysis assumes that costs and benefits present a dichotomy which can be weighed against each other in a self-consistent analytic framework from which we can derive whether the costs of busting caps in baby seals outweigh the benefits of bitchin sealskin threads. Which is why back when I played the game, my first question when I heard CBA was always, "Under your cost/benefit analysis, how many bucks is a human life worth?"

Rip the system,
Brandan

[properwinston]

I completely agree that some serious kritiks can be run on CBA. Primitive CBA is clearly a bad thing. The Holocaust, slavery, Armenian genocide etc, can all be justified through this form of CBA. All that I want is better discussion within the rounds about CBA. We all need to devote more time to reading JS Mill. We spend too much time debating T and not enough time arguing the criteria. The book you mentioned is a good example of the vast amount of material written about CBA.

Also, sorry about my visceral display of western-centrism, but I actually believe it.

[Branarchist]

Hey All:

Well thought out and well reasoned, properwinston. But what is a 'primitive CBA'? How can that be distinguished from an advanced, or less problematic from the K perspective CBA? And for that matter, how many bucks is a human life worth? Or, if you prefer, how many bucks is your mother/father's life worth compared to the lives of Iraqi children and lovable sea turtles?

That's where I think most criteria debate starts to break down. If a criteria is to be a weighing mechanism, then it must be a scale on which two comperable things can be measured. I submit that it is kinda tricky to balance wads of cash against human lives, making the generalized criteria unable to function effectively. That may be why criteria debates don't happen as often as you would hope, because the more we look at various weighing mechanisms, the more we realize that all criteria methods are really just a measure of comparative suckitude. Do you assume the world will suck less post ballot/plan? Then vote gov. If it sucks more, vote opp. How's that for utilitarianism? Eat your heart out, Mill.

Market THIS idea, capitalist pig-dogs!!
Brandan

[PancreasMatt]

interestingly enough, in high school i had a tournament that my policy partner wasn't able to make, so i had to do Lincoln Douglas, and of course the res was hideously slanted to one side and basically forced the aff to support cultural imperialism. So i found some cards written by this dude Chris Morris that basically said that to advocate that enthnocentrism is bad is way ethnocentric since relativism has traditionally been a western idea. So to claim relativism, norris say, puts another engine of moral dominantion onto the field thats just used to hurt those who are not as "enlightened" or "educated" as those who have a concept of equal cultures. Dont agree with it, but its a lefty answer to relativism Ks.
matt c.
p.s. hey, brandan, why is it that Jeeves never knows any of the words you use when i ask him about them? :-) honestly though, i'd like to hear about the polysemic voice K sometime.

[Branarchist]

Hey All:

Trying to out-left the lefty? A very valid strategy, especially in issues like transgendered rights and reparations for slavery, where answering them from the center or right makes it sound like you clicked your jackboots and Heil'd to the Chief before starting prep time. Plus, it's always hilarious to hear the MG go all-out on the shifts trying to prove that way left is good, but your way-way left is very bad.

On the relativism issue, it strikes me that at that point, we enter an evidence war on whether it can be effectively proven that relativism is in fact an ethnocentric concept. The relativists throw out examples like the Ni-Vanuatu and Lao-Tzu / Takuan, while the ethno group brings in the Lakota and Dine. That would be a round worth dragging my hung over butt out of the hotel for...

Track me down at the next tournament, and we'll talk about discourse with multiple voices shaping multiple meanings, the Spivak Bitch-slap, and other fun rhetorical kritik strategies. Now that I've become an actual academic in training (as in, they make us read the primary sources instead of memorizing a 20 second sound byte horribly miscontextualizing them) it could be a fun discussion.

Amend the 1872 Mining Law,
Brandan

P.S. Jeeves can't hang with academic jargon 'cause he ain't priviledged enough. Sick, eh?

[tutakai]

As another fellow academic in training who is spending many hours reading original sources I have one question for you Brandan -- where are you now?

[rmccutch2]

Check out Dr. Robert Trapp's explanation on how to distinguish between the types of resolutions:

www.bethel.edu/Majors/Com...ntary.html (http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/parliamentary.html)

excerpted from above source:

Types of Propositions

Propositions of Fact:
Propositions which assert a factual claim
Propositions which assert a relationship between two objects or concepts

Proposition of Value:
Propositions which evaluate a single object
Propositions which compare two objects with respect to some value

Proposition of Policy:
Propositions which suggest some action based on an evaluation

-Richard

[tutakai]

There are some problems with the typology:

1) There are many resolutions cropping up which blur the lines between "fact" and "value" resolutions. For example, from a recent tournament: "In the arts, myth has replaced excellence." Now, that wording implies evaluation but does not make it clear. Thus, some judges are willing to accept a value framework while others will intervene to drop teams that don't run a "res of fact" list of examples.

2) The typology offers nothing to instruct judges or debaters as to what is "allowable" for a specific type. It is non-controversial to point out that policies instantiate values and values motivate and imply policy directions and that both value and policy determinations rest on factual observations and assumptions. Nonetheless, many judges use typologies to impose a rigid requirement of certain case structures. Should a Gov team automatically LOSE simply because they did not predict correctly the judge's interpretation of the typological requirements?

I think typologies should be subject to critique instead of blind and unthinking application. We should ask ourselves why a typology exists and whether its application is appropriate to a given situation. Even if application is appropriate, method of application should be subject to argument rather than assumed to be the blunt force of the ballot imposed from outside the round by the judge.

But, alas, I appear to be VERY much in the minority on this opinion. I just can't help but wonder why our community pretends to be pedogogically oriented when it so clearly sets up a typopology that functions to undermine education in favor of homogeneity in case selection. Creativity is almost BANNED these days.

[Tutakai]

There are some problems with the typology:

1) There are many resolutions cropping up which blur the lines between "fact" and "value" resolutions. For example, from a recent tournament: "In the arts, myth has replaced excellence." Now, that wording implies evaluation but does not make it clear. Thus, some judges are willing to accept a value framework while others will intervene to drop teams that don't run a "res of fact" list of examples.

2) The typology offers nothing to instruct judges or debaters as to what is "allowable" for a specific type. It is non-controversial to point out that policies instantiate values and values motivate and imply policy directions and that both value and policy determinations rest on factual observations and assumptions. Nonetheless, many judges use typologies to impose a rigid requirement of certain case structures. Should a Gov team automatically LOSE simply because they did not predict correctly the judge's interpretation of the typological requirements?

I think typologies should be subject to critique instead of blind and unthinking application. We should ask ourselves why a typology exists and whether its application is appropriate to a given situation. Even if application is appropriate, method of application should be subject to argument rather than assumed to be the blunt force of the ballot imposed from outside the round by the judge.

But, alas, I appear to be VERY much in the minority on this opinion. I just can't help but wonder why our community pretends to be pedogogically oriented when it so clearly sets up a typopology that functions to undermine education in favor of homogeneity in case selection. Creativity is almost BANNED these days.

[Branarchist]

Hey All:

Yup, artificial typologies can be problematic as dichotomizing agents. And in turn, breaking down those dichotomies can also be problematic in allowing in-round nastyness to occur through shifting the hell out of case or running screaming from the topic. So, as with any procedural issue, I advocate that the fact debate happen in round between two teams ready and willing to grapple with the structures of meaning erected by our personal and cultural backgrounds. Intervention tends to suck, and whether judges are intervening to pick up fact debaters or drop fact debaters, it makes teams feel dirty.

I've found it helpful to recontextualize the resolutional trichotomy into various clouds of meaning, like overlapping fields of attraction plotted in a three dimensional plane. There is no such thing as pure policy absent facts to lay the foundation and values to determine if it's a good idea. There is no such thing as pure value absent facts to contextualize and policy implications to consider. And, of course, all facts are by nature evaluative given that inscribing a symbol onto an object is a naming action with political implications shaped by individual experience and social norms.

That said, the fact that these fields have overlap does not meaningfully destroy the necessity of being resolutional, in that the fuzzy meaning of the resolution as determined by language and social context intersects the overlapping fields of probability at points where the field strength of policy is less than that of fact or value. So, the resolutionality press can be run less as "you're defending the resolution wrong" and more "we have no idea how you got from the resolution to your case, and if you can't explain it to our satisfaction and that of the judge, then you ain't persuasive enough to warrant a ballot." Not to mention our longtime favorite impact, which is destruction of the shared context on which language depends, leaving us all to die bitter and alone in a solipsistic Derridian hell. And you thought resolutionality debates were boring... ;-)

So, hell yeah. We should critique the dichotomies, then assess the results of that critique to see if they're beneficial or not, which is what a resolutionality debate is. Or at least, what I think it should be. And judges intervening on either side of that equation tends to be anti-fun. Be creative, but be willing to show how that creativity proves the resolution or there'll be problems.

Overclock Cheney's pacemaker,
Brandan

P.S. I'm at CSU Long Beach doing a Masters in Rhetoric. Where did y'all end up?